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Summary 
Productivity growth is a precondition for increasing standards of living and maintaining 
competitiveness in the globalised economy. The productivity gap that separates poor and 
rich countries has never been as wide as it is today. Poor countries in particular need to 
emphasise productivity growth in order to alleviate poverty. Although the private sector is 
undoubtedly the main driver of economic growth, governments, too, can help accelerate 
structural change towards more competitive and higher-value activities. This is what in-
dustrial policy is about. 
For this study, we define ‘industrial policy’ as any government measure, or set of meas-
ures, to promote or prevent structural change in ways that the government views as desir-
able. Industrial policy can be classified either as functional or selective. Functional poli-
cies aim at shaping the framework conditions for the whole enterprise sector – e.g. through 
improving macroeconomic stability, upgrading general infrastructure (like electricity gen-
eration capacity) or reforming the legal framework for business. Selective policies, in con-
trast, point at specific industries, sectors, regions or firms using subsidies, tariffs, taxes and 
tax exemptions, targeted infrastructure facilities and targeted businessdevelopment ser-
vices to foster technological learning or to build up industry-specific marketing or export-
service companies. 
Many scholars now acknowledge that selective industrial policy can work well in coun-
tries with strong merit-based public services and political checks and balances. Opinions 
diverge widely, however, with regard to the role of industrial policies – especially selec-
tive policies – in low and lower-middle income countries. These countries typically have 
weak institutions, poorly developed administrative capacities and a shortage of public and 
private financial capital. Hence, even if it is clear that low and lower middle income coun-
tries are faced with particularly severe market failures that justify applying selective indus-
trial policies, there is a big question about the ability of governments to intervene in mar-
kets so as to increase public welfare. 
There are very few empirical studies available that analyse industrial policies in low and 
lower-middle income countries. Most case studies focus on the old industrialised countries 
or on success stories from the newly industrialised countries. This study about industrial 
policy in Mozambique intends to help fill this gap. It is part of a comparative research pro-
ject that includes other country cases from the developing world (see Altenburg 2011). The 
purpose of the study is to describe Mozambique’s main challenges to structural transforma-
tion, its governance structures in the field of industrial policy, and – most importantly – to 
assess the quality of industrial policies and industrial policy making in Mozambique. 
Mozambique is recovering from the ravages of a long struggle for independence from Por-
tugal that was followed by a protracted civil war. At the end of the 1980s the government 
abandoned socialism, underwent a structural adjustment programme and established a 
market-based economy. During the past 15 years, Mozambique’s development has been 
marked by peace and stability, falling poverty rates and high macroeconomic growth. 
Nevertheless, it is still one of the poorest countries in the world and the government 
budget is largely dependent on official development assistance (ODA). 
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In Mozambique there is an urgent need for policies that foster broad-based sustainable 
economic development and generate income and jobs for its population. The remarkable 
macroeconomic growth rates are in large part explained by huge capital-intensive foreign 
direct investment (FDI) projects that add very few jobs to the economy, by the inflow of 
ODA and by the very low level of initial gross domestic product (GDP). The vast majority 
of Mozambicans are not connected to the few profitable and high-value-creating economic 
enclaves, and instead work in subsistence farming, or in mostly informal or non-
competitive small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Linkages between firms are poorly 
developed and there are very few domestic firms that succeed in supplying high-end do-
mestic markets or export markets. Well-designed and well-coordinated industrial policy 
could thus constitute a crucial instrument to foster much-needed, broad-based economic 
growth. Among the sectors that are regarded as potential growth sectors are agriculture 
and agro-industry, tourism, mining and energy. 
Our results, however, show a huge gap between the need for welfare-enhancing industrial 
policies and the capability of the government to design and implement them.  
Several governance features weaken the government’s industrialpolicy management capa-
bility: The strong dominance of a single party Frente de Libertação de Moçambique 
(FRELIMO) blurs the boundaries between it and the government, and weakens checks and 
balances. This is compounded by very close ties between party cadres and leading busi-
nesses (several party cadres direct important business groups that they acquired during the 
privatisation process); weak civil-society organisations; the lack of an independent judici-
ary; and corruption. Moreover, either business associations are weak or they lack strong 
bases; only now are think tanks being developed. Finally, there are only a few very weak 
cross-sectoral coordination platforms to coordinate policies between line ministries and 
different levels of government, and between the private sector and the government. 
Both on paper and in practice functional industrial policies are more elaborated and more 
prominent than selective industrial policies, for instance, trade liberalisation and privatisa-
tion reforms, general FDI promotion, and reforms to make regulations more business-
friendly and improve the general business climate, including access to finance. In contrast, 
selective industrial approaches are less palpable. The Government of Mozambique (GOM) 
does not follow a clear strategy of outlining and guiding targeted selective policies to foster 
the competitiveness of local enterprises, such as developing specific technological capabili-
ties or creating agglomeration economies and other spillovers that would enable local enter-
prises to take advantage of the market enhancement achieved through functional policies. 
Two selective industrial policies that do stand out are analysed in greater detail in this 
study: the promotion of the cashew industry and the promotion of linkages between a huge 
FDI project, the MOZAL aluminium smelter, and local SMEs. Although we have found 
partial successes, no far-reaching development effects are discernable from these ap-
proaches. Our investigation confirms several of the structural deficiencies of the economy 
and of governance weaknesses that have already been pointed out. The partial successes 
found in the two case studies – for cashews, they involved the founding of an export-
service company and the supply of overseas markets, and for linkage promotion they in-
volved the establishment of a number of backward linkages between MOZAL and local 
SMEs, along with (technological) upgrading of these SMEs – are limited in scope and 
substantially due to the strategic advice and practical support of specific donor projects. 
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We conclude that the GOM’s strategic capability for industrial policy management lacks 
the vision and leadership needed to define an appropriate mix between investment climate 
improvements – to create the conditions for private investments and market competition – 
and targeted interventions – to accelerate productivity growth and to enhance firms’ com-
petitiveness. The donors are crucial policy players in Mozambique, but they are unable to 
compensate for these weaknesses because they are not a homogeneous group that advo-
cates for one main strategic line of action. Many of them have followed an approach in-
spired by the ‘Washington Consensus’ that disregarded selective measures: For them, in-
dustrial policy is not a field of intervention with priority. In most cases in which donors 
support selective measures in particular projects, these are limited in scale, scope and time, 
and often do not incorporate government planning and learning cycles. 
The Government’s attitude towards industrial policy is more reactive to the interests of big 
investors and donors than it is proactive or strategic. We base this assessment on our ob-
servation that the policy measures and projects that are enacted and implemented are those 
backed by the coherently and clearly articulated interests of investors (such as investment 
promotion law, big FDI projects in the energy and mining sector) or of donors (liberalisa-
tion, privatisation and Doing-Business-style reforms, which were supported by a coalition 
of powerful donor organisations). In contrast, more complex industrial policy approaches 
– such as regarding SME promotion – that demand an active government role in providing 
strategic direction, building coalitions with enterprises, financial institutions, local gov-
ernments and donors, facilitating or building coordination platforms, etc. only exist on 
paper and don’t have the drive needed to be implemented on a relevant scale. This pattern 
can partly be explained by the low technical capacity and institutional development of the 
State Administration, the weak formal organisation of the local private sector – especially 
small enterprises – and high aid-dependency. The latter creates incentives for the Gov-
ernment to focus primarily on keeping high levels of aid flows in order to secure political 
legitimacy by high spending levels in the social sectors, and thus to neglect – in relative 
terms – engaging in an active industrial policy. 
Furthermore, widespread corruption leads to poor enforcement of measures intended to 
foster local industry (such as the tax on raw cashewnut exports), in the lack of transpar-
ency in awarding contracts, or in the intentional distortion of the implementation of busi-
ness regulations to the advantage of inspectors and at the expense of businesses. The 
FRELIMOparty’s dominance and weak checks and balances run the risk of selective in-
terventions and service providers being misused to transfer resources to constituencies 
before elections in order to secure votes (as interviewees reported in the case of cashew 
promotion). Finally, the fact that top FRELIMO cadres simultaneously hold public office 
and command powerful business groups creates considerable conflicts of interest. This 
situation makes industrial policy and economic policy vulnerable to non-productive mis-
use for the special benefit of enterprises owned by FRELIMO and its cadres. 
Despite this rather pessimistic assessment of Mozambique’s industrialpolicy management 
capability, it is important to acknowledge that some progress and learning have taken 
place in recent years. Capacities in the State Administration (particularly at the Central 
Government level), business associations and think tanks are slowly improving, and along 
with them, the conditions for establishing coordination platforms for selective industrial 
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policies as well. The Government has, moreover, corrected some deficiencies in its policy 
framework, such as the extremely generous tax exemptions for large FDI projects or the 
state-centred top-down approach to SME promotion. Finally, as emphasised above, we 
have also discovered some positive experiences with selective approaches that could be 
replicated. Hence, in Mozambique there seem to be more prospects for a welfare-
enhancing industrial policy that improves the general investment climate and uses targeted 
interventions to stimulate competitiveness and productivity growth of enterprises. Never-
theless, for such an approach to be effectively implemented the Government and donors 
will have to radically revise their strategies and priorities, control corruption, and institute 
a system of checks and balances. 
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1 Introduction 
Productivity growth is a precondition for increasing people’s living standards and main-
taining competitiveness in the globalised economy. The productivity gap separating poor 
and rich countries has never been as wide as it is today. In developing countries, low total-
factor productivity is the main reason for persisting poverty, so to alleviate poverty these 
countries in particular need to increase productivity growth. The challenge is not only to 
develop more productive ways of doing business in the established activities but also to 
accelerate the structural transformation from low productivity activities in agriculture, 
petty trade and skill-extensive services to new activities that are knowledge-intensive and 
exploit the advantages of inter-firm specialisation. 
The main driver of structural change is clearly the private sector. Yet governments play 
important roles in setting policy frameworks that allow for competition and encourage 
innovation and technological change, and also in correcting market failures. There may be 
a need for governments to encourage new activities that cannot emerge without several, 
simultaneous interrelated investments being made (that exceed the capabilities of individ-
ual entrepreneurs); or to support activities that do not pay off immediately for an individ-
ual investor, but are likely to produce manifold linkages and spillovers in the future. With 
such actions, governments can accelerate structural change towards more competitive and 
higher-value activities. This is what industrial policy is about. 
While the theoretical case for industrial policy is not in question, there is no consensus 
about the proper degree of intervention. The controversy is mainly about selective inter-
ventions that favour some sectors over others, thus interfering with the price mechanism, 
which is normally the main signalling device of market economies. Critics argue that gov-
ernments are usually not very good at identifying coordination failures or anticipating fu-
ture knowledge spillovers, and that their decisions may well end up reducing allocative 
efficiency and creating perverse incentives for both investors and bureaucrats. 
It is now widely accepted that industrial policy can work well in countries with strong 
merit-based public services and political checks and balances. Opinions diverge widely, 
however, with regard to the role of industrial policies in low and lower-middle income 
countries where financial resources are often severely limited and core institutions need to 
develop administrative capacities and better incentive systems. According to all available 
governance indicators, most low and lower-middle income countries lag far behind with 
regard to government effectiveness, transparency and accountability1. Hence, even if it is 
clear that these countries face particularly severe market failures, there is considerable 
doubt as to governments’ ability to intervene in markets so as to increase public welfare.  
In any case, it is unlikely that the appropriate policy mix will be the same in low and 
lower-middle income countries as in rich countries because their requirements and capac-
ity for public intervention are substantially different. Yet most empirical case studies of 
industrial policy focus on the old industrialised countries or the famous success stories of 
technological catching up (such as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Brazil and Chile). 
Much less is known about the quality and outcomes of industrial policies in low and 
lower-middle income countries. 
                                                 
1 For more details see Altenburg (2011). 
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This study of industrial policy in Mozambique – part of a comparative research project 
that includes other cases of countries from the developing world 2 – intends to help fill this 
gap. It describes Mozambique’s main challenges to structural transformation, its govern-
ance structures in the field of industrial policy, and most importantly, assesses the quality 
of industrial policies and industrial policy making in Mozambique. 
Chapter 2 outlines the conceptual framework of the study by giving a brief overview of 
the issues in the industrial policy debate and introducing the concepts used here to assess 
the quality of industrial policy making. Chapter 3 describes the context of industrial pol-
icy in Mozambique by working out the main challenges to the economy regarding struc-
tural transformation. Chapter 4 describes the governance patterns that affect the Govern-
ment’s ability and willingness to design and implement sound industrial policies. Chapter 
5 describes and assesses the main industrial policy strategies put into place by the Gov-
ernment before Chapter 6 plunges deeper into the implementation of industrial policy by 
reviewing two cases: (i) the promotion of the cashew industry and (ii) the promotion of 
linkages between SMEs and FDI projects. Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the lessons of 
the preceding chapters and presents some conclusions. 
2 A framework for analysis 
For the purpose of the aforementioned comparative research project, we define ‘industrial 
policy’ as any government measure, or set of measures, to promote or prevent structural 
change in ways that the government views as desirable. Two implications of this defini-
tion need to be highlighted. First, industrial policy has a normative perspective. Most pol-
icy documents address a range of targets, including productivity growth, employment 
creation, social inclusion and environmental sustainability. Second, thanks to this defini-
tion, industrial policies are not restricted to the manufacturing sector, but may also include 
policy measures that attempt to promote promising activities in agriculture or services. 
For the sake of simplicity, measures from the field of industrial policy can be classified 
either as functional or selective (see Altenburg 2011, 12–13). Functional policies aim to 
shape the framework conditions for the whole enterprise sector in a non-discriminatory 
fashion, for example, through improving macroeconomic stability, or supplying the infra-
structure or the legal framework for doing business. Selective policies, in contrast, address 
specific industries, sectors, regions, or firms through subsidies, tariffs, taxes or tax exemp-
tions, targeted infrastructure facilities, etc. 
As indicated above, there is a lot of debate about the justification and effectiveness of se-
lective industrial policies (see Altenburg 2011 for a more thorough discussion of the pros 
and cons). In this debate, there are basically two points at issue:  
1. Dissent over the magnitude and practical relevance of market failures that justify tar-
geted government interventions from a welfare-economics perspective. While one line 
                                                 
2 The DIE research project, “Industrial policy in low- and lower-middle-income countries”, includes 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Namibia, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia and Vietnam – in addition to Mozambique. 
For an overview and lessons from the seven country studies, see Alternburg (2011).  
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of argumentation regards the typical market failures being discussed (coordination 
failures, dynamic economies of scale, knowledge spillovers and information external-
ities) as being exceptions to the rule of perfectly functioning markets, the other line of 
argumentation emphasises the pervasiveness of market failures in real-world econo-
mies or goes so far as to dismiss using welfare theorems based on neoclassical theory 
as a benchmark – due to their underlying unrealistic assumptions (such as perfect 
competition, perfect information, the absence of external effects, etc.). 
2. Dissent over governments’ ability and willingness to design and implement welfare-
enhancing (selective) industrial policies. The debate on ‘ability’ focuses on informa-
tion requirements and government effectiveness, while the debate on ‘willingness’ 
centres around shortcomings regarding the accountability of governors and the trans-
parency of the industrialpolicy making process – features that determine whether in-
dustrial policies serve broad public, or narrow special, interests. Pessimists argue that 
governors face severe information constraints that make it nearly impossible to base 
policy decisions on objective facts. This increases the probability that governments 
will be captured by special interests, and pass measures based on grounds like favour-
itism and rent-seeking, rather than on the struggle for broad-based welfare enhance-
ment. Most proponents of this school of thought favour a clear separation of govern-
ment and the private sector when it comes to political decisions. Optimists, in con-
trast, argue that information constraints in the field of industrial policy are no stricter 
than in any other policy field, and that depending on the governance features of policy 
making, policy outcomes may very well be beneficial for the general public. Propo-
nents of this line of argumentation often call for an intense exchange of information 
between the government and the private sector when it comes to industrial policy 
making (in order to overcome information constraints). Governments should be em-
bedded with the private sector in an institutionalised exchange, yet at the same time 
be autonomous in their decision taking so as to avoid political capture (see Evans 
1996). 
As mentioned in the introduction, there is a growing body of empirical studies on issues 
facing industrialised and newly industrialising countries. However, much less empirical 
research has been done on low and lower-middle income countries. We suppose that both 
the scope of market failure, as well as the capacity to design and enact sound selective 
industrial policies, differ in low and lower-middle income countries. This report, therefore, 
seeks to help fill this gap in the research. 
Although this study deals with the first point at issue alluded to above – particularly when 
describing the challenges for structural transformation faced by the Mozambican economy 
(Chapter 3) – it places more emphasis on the second point. As a basis for assessing the 
Government’s ability and willingness to design and implement sound industrial policies 
that sustainably improve the economy’s competitive performance, we introduce below the 
concept of industrial policy management capability (Altenburg 2011), in four major com-
ponents: 
1. “Strategic capability refers to the ability to design policies conducive to sustainable 
and inclusive productivity growth. This presupposes a good understanding of the 
changing requirements of the global economy as well as the ability to monitor indus-
trial development at home; in addition, it assumes an analytical ability to translate 
the observed phenomena into a strategy of socio-economic transformation; to set tar-
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gets and identify incremental steps towards their achievement; and to create a social 
contract in support of this strategy. Where external actors play key roles (large for-
eign investors, donor agencies, etc.), it is important to align them with the strategy. 
2. The capability to establish clear rules for market-based competition that facilitate 
contract enforcement and easy entry or exit for firms and provide safeguards against 
monopolies and cartels. 
3. The capability to deliver services effectively. Where markets fail to deliver the neces-
sary services, governments must be able to set up service agencies and devise incen-
tive schemes and verifiable performance measurement systems that ensure effective 
and customer-oriented service provision. Meritocratic recruitment and promotion 
systems are key to ensure that the agency staff has a good understanding of the op-
portunities and constraints faced by the private sector. Close interaction and feed-
back loops between service providers and those affected by their decisions are impor-
tant to maintain ’embedded’ relationships. 
4. The capability to create or remove protection when needed, while avoiding political 
capture. Certain levels of protection and other targeted support may need to be pro-
vided by the state to encourage economic diversification and upgrading, but they 
should be phased out as soon as these targets have been achieved. This requires close 
observation of learning processes and the independence to withdraw or reallocate 
rents before they become unproductive. The transparent, predictable and rules-based 
formulation and implementation of policies are important to prevent the abuse of in-
centive systems by politicians, bureaucrats or beneficiaries in industries. Govern-
ments must be held to account for their interventions, such as through general checks 
and balances in the political system – including electoral competition, an indepen-
dent judiciary, and critical feedback from independent media – as well as monitoring 
and evaluation mechanisms built into all major industrial policy programmes.” 
(Altenburg 2011, 21) 
Well-developed capabilities in these areas will favour that industrial policy process be 
based on knowledge rather than on wishful thinking, and more oriented towards the broad 
public interest than towards narrow special interests.  
In addition, it is possible to distil some lessons from the policy-oriented literature regard-
ing “principles of successful industrial policy making” (Altenburg 2009). These principles 
complement the concept of industrial policy management capability when the quality of 
Mozambique’s industrial policy is analysed here. Regarding the implementation of indus-
trial policies, Altenburg (2009, 19) emphasises the following key design principles: 
• “ … [I]mplementing agencies need to have a good understanding of markets and the 
way private enterprises operate. To collaborate effectively with the private sector, 
customer orientation and business-like behaviour are essential. […] Contests that al-
low private sector firms to bid for public resources can be particularly useful. An-
other possibility is demand-side financing via grants or voucher systems. 
• Policy instruments should be as simple and low-cost as possible, especially when the 
administrative capacity of implementing agencies is weak. Self-targeting of benefici-
aries is a good way to avoid political capture. Likewise, compulsory co-financing by 
customers ensures that these will only utilise services which they actually need. 
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• Support should only be provided on a temporary basis as long as market actors need 
to adjust to a changing environment. Credible exit strategies need to be formulated 
early on to signal that support is given for adapting to new challenges – not as an in-
definite subsidy for inefficient rent-seeking industries. 
• Finally, industrial policy should be designed as a systematic process of experimental 
learning. For this purpose, independent monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is essen-
tial. It serves the dual function of learning from trial and error and safeguarding 
against political capture.” 
The remainder of this report describes and assesses the quality of industrial policy making 
in Mozambique, using the concepts outlined above. It should be noted that, as in other 
low-income countries, the availability of reliable data is a major problem there. Policy 
performance is hardly ever monitored and evaluated. While this report also uses quantita-
tive data sources wherever available, many judgements rely on qualitative information 
gathered from experts. The interviews (see Table A4) were conducted in 2009; literature 
and data from January 2010 was used. 
3 The main challenges for structural transformation 
Several analysts consider Mozambique to be one of the few economic success stories in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The country is recovering from the ravages of a long struggle for in-
dependence from Portugal and a protracted civil war. Over the last decade, Mozambique 
has been characterized by peace and stability, falling poverty rates and high macroeco-
nomic growth rates, and benefits from large-scale financial and technical international 
assistance (Clement / Peiris 2008, 11).  
Nevertheless, Mozambique is still one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 172nd 
out of 182 countries, according to the latest United Nations Human Development Index 
(UNDP 2009: life expectancy at birth is 47.8 years, the adult literacy rate is 44.4 percent, 
GDP per capita in purchasing-power parities is USD 802, and 74.7 percent of the popula-
tion survives on less than USD 1.25 a day). The literacy rate and higher education provi-
sion are well below sub-Saharan standards (EIU 2008, 17). According to the United Na-
tions report on the global AIDS epidemic (UNAIDS 2006, 412), 16.1 percent of adults 
between 15 and 49 years of age are HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus) positive. 
The world’s 36th largest country in terms of landmass, Mozambique has a total population 
of approximately 21 million people who are concentrated in the capital, Maputo, and in 
the Northern provinces, Nampula and Zambezi; the rest of the country is sparsely popu-
lated. The country is rich in natural resources. Of the total 799,380 square km, 45 percent 
is considered cultivable (Hughes 2005, 4–5). Mozambique also has mineral resources, 
including gas, coal, gold, titanium, ilmenite, zircon, rutile, and marbles (CPI 2006). The 
country benefits from three East–West ‘development corridors’ – connecting Malawi with 
the port of Nacala (Northern Mozambique), Zimbabwe with the port of Beira (Central 
Mozambique), and South Africa with the port of Maputo (Southern Mozambique) – which 
makes Mozambique a potentially important transport and logistics hub for the region 
(Kaufmann and Simons-Kaufmann 2008). The high cost and the low reliability of trans-
port have prevented Mozambique from taking greater advantage of this potential (Wide 
2010, 24). 
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The remainder of this chapter reviews Mozambique’s main challenges to structural trans-
formation. After a brief summary of Mozambique’s economic history (3.1), it summarises 
the country’s recent macroeconomic development (3.2). The chapter then characterizes 
Mozambique’s enterprise structure, reviews the available indicators for the business envi-
ronment and competitiveness levels (3.3), and examines some sector-specific opportuni-
ties and challenges (3.4), before presenting some conclusions (3.5). 
3.1 A brief overview of Mozambique’s economic history 
To provide a point of reference for the sub-chapters, a brief overview of the Mozam-
bique’s economic history is given here. Economic policy making in Mozambique can be 
divided into three major phases: 
• Under colonialism, economic policy was dominated by Portuguese home-country 
interests and characterized by a mercantilist trade policy, few investments in public 
infrastructure and education, and a strategy of settler colonisation (Cahen 1993, 49). 
In the context of this study it is worth mentioning that the colonial government had a 
quite successful selective industrial policy for the cashew sector in the 1960s and 
1970s (see Case Study 6.1 for more details on the cashew industry). 
• After independence in 1975, the Government followed a central planning approach to 
economic policy, nationalizing certain social and economic sectors (such as schools, 
hospitals, and banks) and promoting production cooperatives in rural areas (Cahen 
1993, 51). This policy offered few incentives to the private sector and entrepreneurship. 
• The latest phase, which began in the late 1980s, is characterized by the transition to a 
formally democratic, multi-party political system and a market-based economic sys-
tem largely built on private ownership. The Government follows an open policy regard-
ing foreign trade that eases foreign investment and prioritizes free trade over the promo-
tion of local manufacturing and processing. Because of Mozambique’s aid dependency, 
donors and multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank have a say in all major policy areas, including economic policy. 
Until the 17th century, the territory that today makes up the Republic of Mozambique was 
mostly under Arab–Swahili influence. With the arrival of the first Portuguese in the 17th 
century, trading posts were opened along the coast. Portugal kept a relatively low profile 
in the area, although this was raised significantly in the 1950s under the dictatorship of 
Salazar (EIU 2008). Even so, Portugal invested relatively few resources in Mozambique, 
particularly with respect to health and education. Mozambique was considered to be a 
‘province’, where almost all the qualified employees in both the private sector and the 
public administration, were Portuguese (Hodges / Tibana 2004, 19). Even in reference to 
that era, the Portuguese colonial administration can be qualified as old-fashioned and 
strongly bureaucratic (Simons-Kaufmann 2003, 77). 
In 1962 the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) was founded and started to 
operate from Tanzania, beginning a war of liberation under the leadership of Samora Ma-
chel. Independence was granted in 1975, after the end of the dictatorship in Portugal and 
the transition of power to a FRELIMO Government led by Machel. In 1977 a single-party 
Marxist state was announced at the 4th FRELIMO Congress. Mozambican nationalism 
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grew and FRELIMO gained political supremacy (EIU 2008, 5). The new Government 
followed a centralised planning approach to economic policy, nationalizing key industries 
and promoting production cooperatives in rural areas. But this approach was not success-
ful and led to a severe social crisis (Cahen 1993, 51–54). 
After 1975 most Portuguese left Mozambique. Most private companies and the public 
administration were barely functioning, and many assets were useless or obsolete as a 
result of damage during the war for independence or their deliberate destruction by for-
mer owners before they left the country. A counter-revolutionary rebel group, the Re-
sistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO), founded in 1975 was supported by 
Rhodesia and South Africa. The civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO (from 
1977 to 1992) further destroyed Mozambique’s infrastructure and economy, bringing the 
country to the brink of collapse. 
Between 1980 and 1986, national production decreased by 30 percent and exports by 75 
percent (Simons-Kaufmann 2003, 80). Under pressure from international creditors, Mo-
zambique joined the IMF and the World Bank in 1984 and started its structural adjustment 
program in 1987. In order to reverse the negative economic development, the Mozambican 
Government aimed at reducing State control over the economy by privatising public com-
panies; promoting the ‘family sector’ in agriculture; improving the marketing of agricul-
tural products; adjusting trade imbalances; improving resource distribution; and expanding 
the private sector’s responsibility for economic activities. Since instituting these reforms, 
Mozambique has enjoyed strong donor support. It remains one of the most aid-dependent 
countries in the world, with more than 50 percent of the State budget funded through ex-
ternal assistance (Bertelsmann Foundation 2008). It is therefore no surprise that donors 
took, and are still taking, an important role in setting Mozambique’s agenda and influenc-
ing its economic and social policies. 
In addition to the economic reforms, in November 1990 Mozambique adopted a new con-
stitution that formally separated the executive, legislative and judiciary functions, and con-
tained a commitment to multiparty democracy. It provided for an electoral system based 
on a proportional representation, with a majority voting system for presidential elections 
and a proportional system for legislative elections (EIU 2008, 9). The country has been 
politically stable since the Rome General Peace Accords ended the civil war in 1992. In 
1994, democratic elections gave a majority to FRELIMO (under President Chissano). 
With the 2004 elections, President Guebuza (also FRELIMO) came into power, and basi-
cally continued the Chissano Administration’s economic and social policies, although he 
also adopted a strategy with more pronounced nationalistic accents that aims at enhancing 
party influence at various levels of government (EIU 2008, 8).  
3.2 Macroeconomic development 
In spite of frequent natural disasters and economic shocks, between 1996 and 2005, Mo-
zambique was able to achieve stable average economic growth of 8.5 percent per year, 
which is among the highest on the African continent (EIU 2008, 33). Table 1 gives an 
overview of macroeconomic indicators for the period from 2002 to 2008. 
Mozambique’s robust macroeconomic performance has been driven by recovery in a 
range of sectors that were devastated by war and poor economic policy – including agri-
culture, transport, manufacturing, tourism and banking – as well as by large inflows of 
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Table 1: Macroeconomic indicators of Mozambique 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 
Nominal GDP (USD bn.)  4.1 4.8 6.1 6.6 7.0 7.8 11.9 
GDP per capita (USD at PPP)   630.0 683.0 749.0* 807.0* 871.0 
Real GDP growth (%)  8.2 7.8 7.5 7.7 8.5* 7.0* 6.5 
Consumer price inflation  
(end-period in %)  16.8 13.4 9.1 11.9 9.4 10.2 6.2 
Population (mil.)  18.7 19.1 20.1 20.5 21.0 21.4 21.8 
Exports of goods fob (USD mil.)  809.8 1,043.9 1,503.9 1,745.3 2,381.0 2,412.0 2,466.0 
Imports of goods fob (USD mil.)  1,476.5 1,648.1 1,849.7 2,242.3 2,649.0 2,811.0 3,061.0 
Current acc. balance (USD mil.)  -869.1 -816.5 -607.4 -760.6 -773.0 -795.0  -1,022.0 
* EIU estimates 
Source: EIU (2007; 2009) 
foreign aid and foreign capital. The showcase ‘mega project’3 MOZAL (an aluminium 
smelter located close to Maputo; for more details, see Case Study 6.2) started in 1998, was 
an important milestone in Mozambique’s development because it opened the doors to FDI 
in the late nineties (Wells / Buehrer 2002). Since then, Mozambique has begun to be con-
sidered a ‘success story’ by some observers (Clement / Peiris 2008, 11) and various capi-
tal-intense mega projects financed with private capital have been started, particularly in 
the mining sector4.  
Mozambique’s international trade is not well diversified. Exports mostly consist of pri-
mary products, in particular aluminium (produced in MOZAL), electricity, tobacco, gas, 
prawns, sugar, cotton, cashew and timber. The major export partners in 2009 were the 
European Union (EU: 57.8 percent of exports, mainly aluminium), South Africa (11.4 
percent), China (3.7 percent), India (2.9 percent), Malawi (2.3 percent), and the USA (2.1 
percent). The main imports are fuels; manufactured goods (consumer goods, machinery, 
and vehicles); agricultural products (mainly cereals); and alumina (a pre-product of alu-
minium). The major import partners are South Africa (33.5 percent of imports), the EU 
(18.5 percent), India (5.9 percent), China (4.2 percent), the USA (3.3 percent) and Japan 
(3.1 percent) (EU 2010; International Trade Centre, no year). 
Mozambique is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations, the African Union (AU), the Organi-
sation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Commonwealth, and has signed the follow-
ing major trade protocols: the SADC Trade Protocol, the African Growth Opportunity Act 
(with the USA), the Everything But Arms (EBA) and Cotonou Agreements (with the EU). 
Due to the limited competitiveness of most domestic companies, the export opportunities of 
these agreements have hardly been used (República de Moçambique 2007a). The trade in-
tegration processes in the context of the SADC and globalisation are viewed as threats, 
pressuring the non-competitive national industries to improve quickly or exit the market. 
                                                 
3 The term ‘mega project’ is commonly used in Mozambique for huge investment finance with foreign 
capital, predominantly in the mining and energy sector.  
4 Besides the MOZAL aluminium smelter, the SASOL gas pipeline and the coalmine in Tete (developed 
by the Brazilian Companhia Vale do Rio Doce) – each with more than USD 1 billion invested – are the 
most prominent mega projects. 
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In spite of the encouraging macroeconomic growth rates, there are concerns that the econ-
omy is developing at two speeds (EIU 2008, 33). To a large extent, growth has occurred 
thanks to massive inflows of FDI in capital-intensive mega projects that have little direct 
impact on employment and few linkages to the local economy. Improvements in export 
performance are also almost exclusively due to mega projects exploiting the mineral and 
other natural resources, without adding much value to the country (Saxegard 2008, 359). 
For example, the aluminium exports from MOZAL alone account for 42 percent of Mo-
zambique’s total export revenue; the manufacturing value added without MOZAL is as 
low as it was in 1971 (APRM 2009, 163–65). Development is clearly faltering in large 
parts of the economy where the majority of the Mozambicans earn their livelihoods, for 
instance in small-scale agriculture and in the SME sector.  
3.3 The enterprise structure, business environment and competitiveness 
The enterprise structure and linkages 
Colonialism left a country with no entrepreneurs and little capital. After the socialist 
phase, therefore, a major economic-policy objective was to privatise and create a class of 
entrepreneurs. The core element of the 1990s reforms was privatisation of most State-
owned enterprises. In 1999, the programme for privatising and restructuring SMEs was 
completed, with more than 1,200 companies transferred to the private sector (Simons-
Kaufmann 2003, 82). Most big companies were sold to foreign investors, while smaller 
companies were mostly bought by domestic investors. Of the larger companies, to date 
only 20 companies – predominantly public-service providers and utilities, such as the air-
ports authority, the ports-and-railways authority, as well as the water and electricity provid-
ers – continue under public ownership. Formally, all the economic institutions required for a 
market economy are in place (Simons-Kaufmann 2003) – except for safeguards to prevent 
the creation of economic monopolies and cartels, and the abuse of monopolistic market 
power, which from a welfare-oriented economic-policy perspective, is a major deficiency. 
The privatisation process of the 1990s was far from ‘perfect’: In order to build up local 
entrepreneurs and firms, the Caixa de Crédito Agrário e de Desenvolvimento Rural started 
to hand out credits (also using donor funds) to freedom fighters, militaries and party mem-
bers – without any intention of getting the money back (Hanlon / Smart 2008, 106). World 
Bank-sponsored SME programmes that aimed at assisting the privatised SMEs also faced 
serious repayment problems. In 1998 the World Bank stated that of the USD 30 million 
spent in SME restructuring programmes, 90 percent would never be paid back (Landau 
1998, 62). Loans financed out of the State budget that were handed out to companies 
owned by the party elite didn’t perform much better (Hanlon / Smart 2008, 107). The un-
favourable track record of such interventions is one of the reasons why donors oppose the 
creation of a State-owned development bank in Mozambique. 
Today, the enterprise structure is marked by (i) a few big enterprises, some of which are 
owned by foreign investors, some are State-owned, and some are private Mozambican 
enterprises owned by the political and business elite; (ii) formally registered SMEs, a few 
owned by international, but most owned by Mozambican, investors; and (iii) a vast uni-
verse of informal SMEs, mostly micro enterprises (Kaufmann 2007). According to the 
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Ministério da Indústria e Comércio (MIC) (2008a, 34) SMEs5 make up 98.6 percent of all 
enterprises, employing 43 percent of the workers and accounting for 76 percent of the total 
sales. In terms of the number of business units, the SME sector is clearly dominated by the 
trade and service sectors (see Table A1 in the Annex). Commerce and retail businesses 
account for nearly 60 percent of all units, followed by restaurants and accommodation (20 
percent). Manufacturing, with less than 10 percent of business units, nevertheless accounts 
for almost 40 percent of the total sales volume. Most of these industries (about 80 percent) 
are located in Maputo and Beira, respectively the capital and the second largest city. 
An influential strand in the literature regards SMEs in general as important drivers for 
growth and poverty reduction (Lledo 2008, 330). But in Mozambique at present, no such 
role is discernible for the SME sector, which mainly consists of micro-enterprises that are 
oriented towards the local market and are not competitive. In general, they lack growth 
perspectives (Kaufmann and Parlmeyer 2000). In an empirical study Krause et al. (2010) 
found that the formalisation and development of SMEs are hampered by the entrepre-
neurs’ and workers’ poor education and training, burdensome and non-transparent regula-
tions, the high cost of credit and the poorly developed infrastructure. 
A further important feature of the SME sector – which can be regarded both as a symp-
tom, and a cause, of its lack of dynamism – is the fact that inter-firm linkages are not well 
developed, either amongst the SMEs or between SMEs and large firms (República de 
Moçambique 2007b, 29). Only in rare cases have Mozambican SMEs managed to estab-
lish and benefit from industrial linkages with, for instance, FDI projects. Strategic clusters 
or networks do not exist, and subcontracting and outsourcing services to local SMEs is not 
a common practice of big enterprises (Kaufmann 2008). 
Most national companies do not have any competitive advantage in terms of technologies, 
processes, products or marketing strategies (República de Moçambique 2007a). Mozam-
bique’s manufacturing sector is small, with production highly concentrated in a few sec-
tors. It also exhibits a low degree of intra-sector linkages: With the exception of agro-
processors, most producers source their raw materials from abroad rather than from the 
local economy. At the same time, manufacturers are overwhelmingly inwards oriented; 
very few firms export a substantial part of their outputs. 
The business environment and competitiveness 
Mozambique can be classified as highly bureaucratic, with cumbersome regulations 
that are inefficiently and inconsistently applied (KPMG 2008; World Bank 2009b6). 
According to the World Bank’s 2010 ranking in the ‘Ease of Doing Business Index’, 
Mozambique is 135th out of 183 countries (see Table 2). Although the indicator for 
‘Starting a Business’ has recently improved, other indicators in areas that are directly 
linked to the process of starting a business, for instance, ‘Dealing with Construction 
Permits’, ‘Registering Property’ and ‘Employing Workers’ are highly problematic. In 
                                                 
5 The National Institute of Statistics’ (INE) definition of an SME: An enterprise that employs up to 99 
workers (MIC 2008a, 5). 
6 See also Eberherr / Kaufmann / Simons-Kaufmann (2009) for the province of Inhambane, and Krause et 
al. (2010) for an analysis of the impact of business regulations on the formalisation and development of 
SMEs. 
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the area of labour regulations, a recent reform instituted some slight improvements, 
especially for SMEs, by reducing the cost of severance payments. For ongoing busi-
nesses, Mozambique’s low rankings for ‘Trading Across Borders’, ‘Getting Credit’ 
and ‘Enforcing Contracts’ – the latter directly linked to the poor performance of the 
legal system – are still major concerns that induce high transaction costs, thereby re-
ducing the competitiveness of existing companies and compromising the motivation 
for start-ups. Overall, although there has been some modest progress with regard to 
business regulations, no significant improvements have been made in recent years. 
This is explained by the lack of trained administrative staff; the tradition of a bureauc-
racy that considers its main function to be controlling the business sector; problems 
with inter-ministerial coordination; and insufficient drive for ‘radical’ reforms. 
The Doing Business Index basically attempts to measure the cost of business regulations. 
An alternate approach to describe the business environment is to take the entrepreneur’s 
perspective and ask what they consider to be their major constraints. In this vein, Figure 1 
shows the top 10 constraints according to the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys. Amongst 
the most pressing constraints named by entrepreneurs are access to finance, informal or 
illegal competition, physical infrastructure (electricity and transport), tax rates and crime, 
theft and disorder. 
The Mozambican Business Confidence Index (KPMG 2008), published by KPMG Mo-
zambique and the umbrella business association, Confederação das Associações 
Económicas (CTA), is also based on an enterprise survey that includes a significant num-
ber of SMEs in the provinces outside Maputo. According to this source, entrepreneurs’ 
greatest concerns are corruption, crime, and excessive bureaucracy. Interestingly, the re-
sults vary significantly between regions and sectors, suggesting a need for differentiated 
analysis and policy action (Kaufmann / Krause 2008). 
The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) of the World Economic Forum takes an even 
broader perspective on the business environment (see Table 3). It assesses a broad variety 
of ‘pillars’ that enhance an economy’s competitiveness, ranging from basic requirements 
(e.g., infrastructure and macroeconomic stability) to enhancers of innovation and sophisti-
cation (e.g., the intensity of innovations). After the review undertaken so far, it comes as 
no surprise that Mozambique ranks very low in the GCI: 130th out of 134 countries. The 
country’s economy can be characterised as being purely factor-driven. 
As can be seen in Table 3, for most pillars Mozambique is ranked at the very low end of 
the scale. An exception is labour-market efficiency (rank 98), which has improved since 
the recent labour-law reform. Still, the ‘basic requirements’ are weak, with infrastructure, 
health and primary education ranked particularly low. With regard to transport infrastruc-
ture – despite the significant investments since the end of the civil war – Mozambique 
has the lowest road coverage in Southern Africa: 32 km of roads per 1,000 km2 in 2003, 
compared to an average of 135 km. Out of the classified road network, only 57 percent 
is maintained, – again the lowest rate in Southern Africa where in 1997 the average was 
71 percent (World Bank 2003). 
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Table 2: Mozambique’s rank in the Doing Business Index 
Ease of... Doing Business 2010 Rank 
Doing Business 2009 
Rank Change in rank 
Doing business 135 140 +5 
Starting a business 96 143 +47 
Dealing with construction 
permits 159 151 -8 
Employing workers 156 156 0 
Registering property 151 154 +3 
Getting credit 127 125 -2 
Protecting investors 41 38 -3 
Paying taxes 97 92 -5 
Trading across borders 136 138 +2 
Enforcing contracts 129 128 -1 
Closing a business 136 135 -1 
Source: Doing Business website (www.doingbusiness.org) 
 
Figure 1: Main constraints to firm investment according to World Bank’s enterprise surveys 
Source: The World Bank Group (2011) 
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Table 3: Mozambique’s ranking in the Global Competitiveness Index 
 Rank Score 
GCI 2008–2009 (out of 134) 130 3.1 
GCI 2007–2008 (out of 131) 128 3.0 
GCI 2006–2007 (out of 122) 119 3.2 
Basic requirements 2008–2009 131 3.2 
1st pillar: institutions 112 3.3 
2nd pillar: infrastructure 124 2.2 
3rd pillar: macroeconomic stability 112 4.2 
4th pillar: health and primary education 132 3.2 
Efficiency enhancers 2008–2009 129 3.1 
5th pillar: higher education and training 129 2.6 
6 th pillar: goods market efficiency 127 3.4 
7 th pillar: labour market efficiency 98 4.1 
8 th pillar: financial market sophistication 122 3.3 
9 th pillar: technological readiness 116 2.5 
10 th pillar: market size 107 2.6 
Innovation and sophistication factors 2008–2009 127 2.8 
11 th pillar: business sophistication 128 3.1 
12 th pillar: innovation 120 2.5 
Score: 7 highest, 1 lowest 
Source: WEF (2008, 250) 
The GCI assesses Mozambique’s potential transaction-cost-reducing institutions, like ethi-
cal business behaviour, effective and reliable police and court services, intellectual prop-
erty protection and effective company boards, as being ‘weak’. Business development 
services are rarely available for SMEs, particularly outside Maputo. All the sub-factors of 
‘business sophistication’ – which include factors like local supplier quantity, local supplier 
quality, state of cluster development, value-chain breadth, and production-process sophis-
tication – are ranked below 100. Altogether, the poorly developed ‘pillars’ result in a very 
low factor productivity, which constitutes a big challenge for Mozambique’s economic 
development (Jones 2008; World Bank 2009a). 
3.4 Sector-specific opportunities and challenges 
According to several experts, Mozambique’s main opportunities for economic develop-
ment are its natural endowments and the production of primary products.7 The African 
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM 2009, 169) supports this view in a recent publication 
                                                 
7  For more details see, e.g. Wide (2010). 
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that identifies the following key sectors with growth potential: agriculture, mining, and 
tourism. The opportunities and specific challenges in realising the potential in these sec-
tors are briefly summarised below. 
Agriculture 
Mozambique is endowed with a huge area of cultivable land. Out of the total surface area 
of 799,380 km2, 45 percent is considered cultivable, of which 2.8 percent is occupied by 
permanent, and 53 percent by shifting, agriculture (Hughes 2005, 4–5). Consequently, 
great potential is foreseen in the intensification of agriculture, which is now characterized 
by subsistence farming. According to Castel-Branco (2002, 232), “[A]gro-industry is im-
portant from the point of view of rural industrialisation, inter-sectorial linkages, employ-
ment, diversification of production and trade, and balance of the class interests that influ-
ence the manufacturing sector.” 
Some cash crops have done better, among them, sugar, tobacco, horticulture, and bananas. 
Foreign investors are mostly driving the improvements through contract farming (tobacco) 
or plantation agriculture (sugar). Cashew production and processing are also slowly recov-
ering, especially in the northern parts of the country (see the Case Study in Section 6.1). 
Bio-fuel is considered to have potential, but is still insignificant. The increasing quantity 
of timber exports (unprocessed logs), mainly to Asia, should be regarded more as a threat 
to sustainable development than as an opportunity because logs come mostly from primary 
forests with little or no replanting and exploitation is largely illegal (EIU 2008, 35–38). 
Probably the three most important barriers to the development of agriculture are (i) the 
difficult access to land and the insecurity of land-use rights as well as (ii) the structure and 
organisation of farmers, who are mostly atomised smallholders engaged in subsistence 
farming (there are very few commercially oriented farmers or farmers’ associations that 
could form the backbone of a modernization process); and (iii) the lack of efficient exten-
sion services. Regarding the first barrier, an important feature of Mozambican land law 
must be stressed: All land is owned by the State. However, individuals are granted land 
use rights for 50 years that can be renewed for another 50 years. The difficulty and insecu-
rity doesn’t come so much from the rules themselves, as from the way they are imple-
mented, which gives scope for extensive bureaucratic interference, creating opportunities 
for corruption and rent-seeking behaviour (Hughes 2005, 26).8 Furthermore, this legal situa-
tion makes access to finance more difficult (because of the resulting lack of collaterals). 
Further challenges to the development of agriculture are fragmented markets, poor trans-
port and storage infrastructure, low productivity (below sub-Saharan standards), and pro-
nounced climatic variability. Finally, supporting institutions like research facilities are 
either not available or inefficient (Hanlon / Smart 2008). 
Although donors have allocated substantial resources to this sector through the PROAGRI 
programme that was created to guide aid allocation and public expenditure in agriculture, 
so far the results have been disappointing.  
                                                 
8 Jim LaFleur (Table A4) sees the unequal and unfair access to land as the major factor limiting eco-
nomic, and especially agricultural, development. See also Hanlon / Smart (2008). 
Industrial policy in Mozambique 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 19 
Mining and energy 
As already described in this chapter, Mozambique is endowed with important mineral and 
natural resources, including gas, hydroelectricity, coal, gold, titanium, ilmenite, zircon, 
rutile and marbles (CPI 2006). Not surprisingly, the most important FDI projects, each 
involving more than USD 1 billion, have been made in this sector: MOZAL (see Section 
6.2), SASOL (gas deposits), and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (coal deposits). 
The most important constraints to attracting more investments in the mining sector are insuf-
ficient information about the geology, poor infrastructure, inadequate legal and regulatory 
frameworks (especially regarding land tenure), and a lack of reliability and transparency in 
the awarding of concessions. Mozambique recognizes that it has to improve governance in 
this sector, and the Government has expressed its intention to accede to the Extractive In-
dustries Transparency International Initiative (APRM 2009, 164; Hartley / Otto 2008). 
However, the biggest challenge is to use Mozambique’s mineral and energy-resources 
wealth for broad-based development that benefits the whole economy. Mega projects in 
the mining sector are characterized by capital-intense investments that, apart from the con-
struction phase, generate only modest domestic employment and typically do not create 
significant backward or forward linkages with local enterprises or knowledge spillovers. 
In this context, the practice of granting generous tax exemptions to foreign investors in the 
mining sector should also be reviewed: According to the APRM (2009, 164), MOZAL has 
been granted tax exemptions for 50 years, Sasol for 35 years, and Vale do Rio Doce for 25 
years. While tax incentives may be an important policy instrument to attract investments 
in the first place, excessive scope and duration of exemptions prevents the generation of 
tax revenue needed to build and improve market-enhancing institutions and invest in ‘ba-
sic requirements’ such as health, education and infrastructure. 
Tourism 
The number of tourists visiting Mozambique increased fourfold between 1995 and 2004 
(EIU 2008, 60). Up-market accommodations, diving, game parks and water sports are 
viewed as strategic opportunities for tourism development. Still, given Mozambique’s 
strong tourism asset base, including a long coast with beautiful beaches and islands, as 
well as its proximity to South Africa, the development of this sector has lagged behind 
expectation. The country receives only 2 tourists per 100 inhabitants, which is half the 
continent’s average. Apparently, Mozambique-based companies have difficulty competing 
on the international market, which must be considered key, given the low domestic de-
mand for tourism services (FIAS 2006, Ch. 1). 
On one hand, the constraints are rooted in the flaws of the Mozambican business regula-
tions and public administration reviewed above, such as uncertainty regarding land access, 
cumbersome licensing procedures, excessive bureaucracy and corruption. Another set of 
factors has to do with the lack of complementary public investments and the tourism in-
dustry’s low level of organisation and development, such as unfavourable bilateral air-
service agreements which, given the country’s remote location, make air connections to 
Europe too expensive; the lack of investment in domestic airports; weak coordination 
among key stakeholders and weak effort at marketing Mozambique’s image and destina-
tions abroad; and the low quality of tour operators and ancillary-service providers (Kauf-
mann / Krause 2008, 234–235). 
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3.5 Preliminary conclusions 
In 2002, Castel-Branco (2002, 231) described the Mozambican economy as characterized 
by the following basic features: “semi-processing of primary products for export”; the 
production of internationally uncompetitive goods for the domestic market; and the provi-
sion of migrant labour force and transport services for the Southern African region. 
The review in this chapter suggests that this concise summary is still accurate. Conse-
quently, one important challenge to structural transformation is increasing the value added to 
the exported (mineral and agricultural) products by linking the domestic enterprises to these 
export processes, and by gradually diversifying production, both for export and for the domes-
tic market. 
In order to master these and further challenges, industrial policy has to deal with a complex set 
of structural deficits that together result in the Mozambican economy’s extremely low produc-
tivity and competitiveness. The most important deficits can be summarised as follows:  
• The lack of management knowledge and the labour force’s low level of training and 
skills (80 percent of the labour force is inadequately trained); 
• A badly trained and ineffective public-administration staff, combined with cumber-
some regulations and corruption, that result in high costs of doing business and ex-
porting; 
• The lack of access to credit and the high cost of capital; 
• The lack of businessdevelopment services; 
• Insufficient norms, standards and quality checks; 
• High costs and irregular supply of water and energy; 
• High costs and the low predictability of transport; 
• Obsolete technology and the shortage of spare parts (50 percent of all companies use 
technology that is more than 15 years old); 
• The lack of coordination between different State institutions promoting industrial de-
velopment – which results in the absence of systematic and consistent approaches. 
4 Governance patterns: the background of industrial policy making 
This chapter characterizes some basic governance patterns of Mozambique that arguably 
influence the country’s industrialpolicy management capability. By way of introduction, 
Table 4 provides an overview of the World Bank Governance Indicators for the years 
1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008. While the upward tendency of the indicator for ‘political sta-
bility’ clearly reflects the post-war achievements of peace and the orderly succession of 
governments, as shown in a comparison of the years 2000 and 2008, the remaining indica-
tors have stagnated. The lowest rankings in 2008 are registered for ‘rule of law’ (percen-
tile rank 32.1), ‘regulatory quality’ (37.7) and ‘control of corruption’ (38.2).  
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Table 4:  World Bank Governance Indicators: Mozambique’s percentile rank* 1996–2008 
Governance indicator 2008 2004 2000 1996 
Voice and accountability 46.2 47.6 44.7 49.3 
Political stability 54.5 39.4 46.2 30.3 
Government effectiveness 42.5 36.9 41.7 53.9 
Regulatory quality 37.7 36.6 43.9 19.0 
Rule of law 32.1 29.5 29.0 24.3 
Control of corruption 38.2 29.6 38.3 51.0 
*)  The percentile rank indicates the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below the selected country. Higher 
 values indicate better governance ratings. 
Source: World Bank; online: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (accessed 27 Nov. 2010) 
We discuss below a set of governance features and actors that we regard as important con-
text factors influencing or shaping the industrialpolicy-making process in Mozambique. 
These are the pervasiveness of corruption and rent-seeking (4.1); the dominance of  
FRELIMO and the weakness of checks and balances and the rule of law (4.2); and the 
main industrialpolicy players, such as the economic interest groups linked to the political 
elite and the donors (4.3). 
4.1 The pervasiveness of corruption and rent-seeking 
Besides the World Bank Governance Indicator ‘control of corruption’, several other 
sources point to the pervasiveness of corruption in Mozambique (e.g., USAID 2005; 
Bertelsmann Foundation 2008; Transparency International 2008; APRM 2009). For in-
stance, Transparency International (2008) characterizes Mozambique as ‘endemic cor-
rupt’, with a score of 2.8.9 Corruption takes a variety of forms, all of which are common in 
Mozambique: (i) state capture by particularistic or narrow interests in order to influence 
laws, regulations and policies; (ii) patronage and nepotism resulting for example in con-
tracts that are awarded based on favours or in unmerited appointments to public office; 
and (iii) administrative or bureaucratic corruption, which refers to the intentional distor-
tion of regulatory implementation to the advantage of individuals (APRM 2009, 294). The 
pervasiveness of corruption constitutes a handicap to successful industrial policy because it 
increases the likelihood that industrial policy measures will be misused for rent-seeking activi-
ties and the exclusive benefit of a narrow, privileged class of businessmen and politicians. 
Although the Government has launched an anti-corruption strategy, there is no evidence of 
a decline in corruption, and corrupt practices appear to be socially tolerated (APRM 2009, 
98). According to United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2005, 
5–8), some features of Mozambique’s governance make it particularly difficult to fight 
corruption. First, there are the social legacies, in particular the lack of democratic culture 
and the dominant role of the extended family in social and economic life. The view that citi-
zens have the right (and obligation) to hold elected governors accountable for their actions  
is not yet developed in the young Mozambican democracy. Moreover, it is the extended 
                                                 
9 On Transparency International’s scale, the worst possible score is 1 and the best possible score is 10. 
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family above all that provides Mozambicans with social security and income opportuni-
ties. “As a result, much behaviour that might be viewed as conflicts of interest, nepotism, 
and favouritism is not generally judged as corrupt practices. Instead, Mozambicans who 
achieve positions of authority and influence, are often expected to use their position to 
help family members and friends to get jobs, avoid red tape, and circumvent the system” 
(USAID 2005, 8). Second, checks and balances and the rule of law are weak in the Mo-
zambican system, which means that horizontal accountability mechanisms are poorly devel-
oped and impunity is common. These latter two features are further elaborated below (4.2). 
The view that corruption is very deeply rooted in Mozambique and practically constitutes 
a part of its ‘culture’, is put into perspective by Hanlon / Mosse (2009, 3) who state that 
“[t]he late 1970s had been an era of exceptional integrity; the leadership under Samora 
Machel was quite puritanical and any corruption was harshly punished, while the enthu-
siasm for independence and building a new country created a collaborative spirit that 
militated against private enrichment.” The authors argue that corruption started to spread 
because of the civil war, which made controls impossible, and the opaque way in which 
privatisation was carried out (see Section 3.3), which was tolerated by donors because 
they were so anxious to promote privatisation (Hanlon / Mosse 2009, 4). 
4.2 Single-party dominance, weak checks and balances and the rule of law 
The FRELIMO party has ruled Mozambique since independence in 1975. Only after the end 
of the civil war was the FRELIMO Government legitimised in 1994 by free general elec-
tions (for the Presidency and the Parliament). FRELIMO has won all subsequent elections at 
the national level (1999, 2004 and 2009), always winning the absolute majority in the na-
tional parliament and the presidential elections. This ‘quasi monopoly’ has contributed to 
blurring the distinction between party and Government and has undermined the checks and 
balances between the country’s different branches of government (USAID 2005; see also 
Öhm 2009). Because of its supremacy and the electoral system, FRELIMO has strong influ-
ence over members of parliament. Parliamentarians “are chosen on [the] basis of propor-
tional representation using provincial party lists” (Chakravarti 2005, 146), which gives the 
party strong control over them. Moreover, the party – through its members in the executive 
branch – practically controls the judiciary, thereby undermining its independence (Mosse 
2006).10 For example, the nomination of judges is not carried out in a transparent manner, 
and to become a judge, a candidate apparently has to have close ties to the executive or the 
party. According to Hanlon / Smart (2008, 116–118), the development of an independent, 
well-functioning legal system is not a high priority for the Government. 
FRELIMO’s supremacy has reduced its incentives to reach out to civil society for alterna-
tive perspectives, which contributes to polarization and reduces its accountability to citi-
zens. Apart from RENAMO and to a certain extent, a new party founded in Beira in 2009 
(the Democratic Movement of Mozambique), there are no significant national power bases 
in the country that could compete with the ruling party to make political competition more 
vigorous and transparent.11 Moreover, the blurring of the separation of powers and the lack 
                                                 
10 The lack of independence is just one problem of the legal system in Mozambique. Another big problem 
is the lack of expertise and training (Mosse 2006; USAID 2005). 
11 In 2003, RENAMO at least managed to win the local mayoral elections for mayors in 5 out of 33 auto-
nomous cities – all the others were won by FRELIMO; in 2008, however, FRELIMO won the local 
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of independence of the judiciary has generated a culture of impunity that undermines the 
rule of law. Party officials seldom risk sanctions or punishment for disrespecting the law 
or for corrupt behaviour (Öhm 2009). Finally, the party’s dominance has a big influence 
on recruitment for public service: In practice, only FRELIMO members are recruited – 
which apart from being discriminatory, harms the capacity and quality of the public ser-
vice when party membership is given preference over technical qualifications. The capac-
ity of public servants is generally low, with only a few receiving adequate formation or 
training for their positions (DFID 2006). 
Civil society is not able to countervail this lack of checks and balances. There is no well-
developed network of civil society organisations or formalised interest groups (more on 
the role of business associations below). Civil society organisations typically depend on 
state or donor initiatives and their agendas are closely connected to their sponsors’ agen-
das (Nuvunga 2009, 20). Moreover, there are only a few opportunities for civil society 
organisations to monitor government activities, and their capacity and levels of organisa-
tion are weak (MASC 2008). The most important group of civil society organisations is 
the ‘G20 Network’, which was set up during the ‘Poverty Observatory’ process to monitor 
the implementation of the Mozambican povertyreduction strategy (PARPA – Plano de 
Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta, see also Section 5.1). Independent local re-
search capacity in Mozambique is weak and slowly developing – although lasting recent 
years, some noteworthy think tanks have been established, such as the Instituto de Estudos 
Sociais e Económicos (IESE), the Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP) and Cruzeiro do Sul. 
Since the formal installation of a multi-party democracy, the media have become more 
pluralistic (Hanlon / Smart 2008, 200). But despite increasing diversity, the State contin-
ues to play an influential role since it owns an important part of the media. Because of 
high levels of illiteracy and poverty, radio is the only medium to reach most of the popula-
tion (Hodges / Tibana 2004). According to the Freedom of the Press Index 2008, Mozam-
bique is classified as ‘partly free’, ranking 86th out of 195 countries (Beula 2009) – which 
is above average for sub-Saharan Africa. 
4.3 Important industrial policy players 
This section briefly characterizes the role of three important groups of players that have a 
stake or a say in industrial policy making: the business elite linked to FRELIMO, the 
business associations and donors. 
The business elite linked to FRELIMO 
There are important ties between the political and economic elite in Mozambique that cre-
ate conflicts of interest.12 Particularly influential are high-level FRELIMO cadres, such as 
the Machel family, the Chissano family or the Guebuza family, who simultaneously run 
                                                                                                                                                   
mayoral elections for mayors in all but one autonomous city: Beira – which was won by an indepen-
dent candidate. 
12   A well-documented case concerned awarding a concession for non-intrusive inspection services (scan-
 ners) for the port of Maputo to a FRELIMO-owned enterprise. Cf. Mosse / Munguambe (2007). 
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important business groups.13 Particularly during the privatisation process, these and other 
party cadres used their political power to increase their private wealth. They have built up 
powerful business groups, secured the land-use rights of large, economically-attractive 
areas, and obtained concessions for profitable business activities (Hanlon / Mosse 2009).14  
The fact that FRELIMO has managed to remain united over such a long period has helped 
it stay in power. However, according to Hanlon / Mosse (2009, 4), despite the party’s 
outward unity, the party elite is divided into two groups: (i) the predatory group that 
merely looks for rent-seeking and personal gain, leaving the development agenda to do-
nors and foreign investors, and (ii) the developmental group that “looked to entrepreneu-
rial activities that would promote Mozambican development, and continued with a tradi-
tional Frelimo ideology of wanting to ‘develop’ Mozambique.” Hanlon / Mosse (2009) 
state that the latter group has become more influential under President Guebuza, and 
speculate whether the combination of a development-oriented industrial policy agenda 
supported by this FRELIMO faction and the productive use of its business empires (by 
Guebuza, for instance) could serve as the backbone of a successful welfare-enhancing 
industrial development for Mozambique in the style of the Asian tigers. 
Business associations 
Since the late 1980s, numerous business associations have been established in Mozam-
bique, some of which represent sector interests at the national level, while others represent 
regional business interests across sectors. In general, few of these business associations are 
effective in communicating business interests to the Government or in providing business-
development services to their members; further, few manage to collect member fees and 
remain afloat. One possible explanation for the relatively low relevance of business asso-
ciations in Mozambique is that most important State–business relations are made using the 
close ties between the party and the business elite. For a businessman it is probably there-
fore much more important to be a party member, or to be otherwise connected to  
FRELIMO, than to be a member of a business association. 
Nevertheless, there are some relevant business associations (e.g. ACIS, see below) that 
have formed the umbrella organisation Confederação das Associações Económicas de 
Moçambique (CTA), which has become the private sector’s principal and almost ‘official’ 
Government interlocutor (Hodges / Tibana 2004, 81). Strongly supported by donors, the 
CTA has a growing technical capacity and organises a series of dialogues with the Gov-
ernment on private-sector policy issues, like the annual private-sector conference or the 
semi-annual forum with the Prime Minister. Moreover, the CTA represents business in the 
private sector’s donor working group. 
The CTA is still struggling to define its role. Its mission to represent private-sector inter-
ests is challenged by the enterprise sector’s fragmentation (see Section 3.3) and by the 
strong network of political and business elites described above. Big international investors 
are usually able to negotiate directly with governments and do not depend on the CTA 
(see also the case study in Section 6.2). The same is true for businesses linked to the re-
gime that use informal channels or the party to communicate with the Government. The 
                                                 
13   See also: The Indian Ocean Newsletter 31.5.2008: “Guebuza family has finger in every pie”. 
14   On this topic, see also EIU (2008, 30) and APRM (2009, 279–81). 
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vast universe of unorganised informal and micro-enterprises do not have the means to en-
gage with the CTA, which therefore remains largely limited to the small group of formal 
SMEs. The CTA depends to a good degree on donor contributions (it also receives some 
support from the State budget, and from its members). Several CTA members and execu-
tives are linked to, or are members, of the ruling party, creating a conflict of interest when 
the CTA negotiates with the Government. 
One of the few business associations that apparently represent genuine business interests, 
and that has the organisational and financial means to articulate and voice these interests, 
is the rapidly growing ACIS (Associação Comercial e Industrial de Sofala). ACIS is based 
in Beira, the capital of the province of Sofala. Its members are mainly formal, medium-
sized enterprises – many of them owned by foreign investors – that are not closely linked 
to the political elite. ACIS has repeatedly criticised the Government openly. 
Donors 
Since the late 1980s, when Mozambique started to cooperate with the IMF and World 
Bank in a structural adjustment programme, donors have been important, influential 
stakeholders in policy formulation (for the World Bank’s influence on the cashew-policy 
framework, see Box 2 in Section 6.1). Today over 20 multi- and bilateral agencies are en-
gaged in official development cooperation with Mozambique, which is one of the most 
aid-dependent countries in the world. 
Some analysts consider Mozambique to be ‘a model for donor coordination’ and a case in 
which the international donor community and the partner government have jointly im-
proved aid effectiveness (Fischer et al. 2008, 238 ff.). Donors are an important, if not the 
most important, dialogue partners of the Government (de Renzio / Hanlon 2007). The 
Programme Aid Partners (PAP), who are engaged in budget support, participate in policy 
formulation in a particularly active manner – through donor working groups, joint-review 
mechanisms, and the elaboration of programme approaches, etc. They also shape policy 
through the Programme Assessment Framework (PAF), which defines priorities for action 
and indicators to monitor the development process, including good governance and eco-
nomic development.15 
The dialogue between the PAPs and the Government in the context of the budget-support 
mechanism offers potentially transparent, open and productive discussion and cooperation. 
Several observers consider that donors play a positive role in promoting the Government 
of Mozambique’s development-orientation and accountability. But it is not always clear if 
reforms are backed by genuine national policy and party interests, or if instead they are 
donor-driven – and thus ultimately lack the ownership needed to be effectively imple-
mented. Since Mozambique is highly dependent on aid and democratic accountability is 
not well developed, the Government risks being more accountable to the donors than to its 
constituency (Castel-Branco 2008; de Renzio / Hanlon 2007). Not even PAPs always 
speak with one voice which may hamper consistency in policy formulation. Moreover, 
critics maintain that on some occasions, donors appear to have tolerated Government corruption 
to achieve their programmatic goals, such as the privatisation of Mozambique’s enterprises 
(Hanlon / Mosse 2009, 4). 
                                                 
15   See http://www.pap.org.mz/. 
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Donors have not promoted a selective industrialpolicy agenda, but rather the opposite. 
The ‘Washington Consensus’ did not favour selective industrialpolicy approaches, and 
most donors conventionally viewed economic development as being basically about 
macroeconomic stability, liberalisation, privatisation, and lowering the costs of trans-
actions through Doing-Business-style reforms – issues that in recent years have domi-
nated the debate about economic reform. The joint review, which assesses government 
performance based on defined indicators, does not reflect a philosophy of selective 
industrial policy, but does mention indicators for monitoring the implementation of 
Doing-Business-style reforms.16 
Moreover, donors prefer to engage in clearly defined sectors like health and educa-
tion. Industrial policy is a cross-cutting task which is neither reflected in donor struc-
tures, such as donor working groups, nor in the organisation of the line ministries. In 
fact, the Government lacks a powerful coordination platform to implement an indus-
trial policy approach. Something similar happens in the policy field of private-sector 
development, which is not part of the donors’ combined-budget-support efforts. Pri-
vate-sector development or local economic-development activities often result from 
bilateral donor projects that are not linked to any national strategy. Several of these 
projects support local value chains, for example, local brick production for construc-
tion or the production of oil from locally grown seeds. These efforts are mostly lim-
ited in scope and time and do not incorporate government planning and learning cy-
cles, and their impact on the structural transformation of the economy is generally 
limited. 
5 Industrial development strategy 
This chapter summarises the key Government strategies in the field of industrial pol-
icy (those that aim to structurally transform the economy), as defined in Chapter 2. 
These strategies are not necessarily ‘selective’ and they are not necessarily mutually 
coherent. Since most of these strategies are very recent, the chapter focuses on de-
scribing and summarising the respective Government papers; discussion of the im-
plementation and impact of the strategies is cursory and restricted to a few cases 
where information is available. For more evidence on the implementation and impact 
of industrial policies, see the two Case Studies in Chapter 6 on cashew-industry- and 
linkage promotion. 
The rest of this chapter summarises and discusses the following strategies: the pover-
tyreduction strategy (5.1), the industrial development strategy (5.2), the investment 
promotion strategy (5.3), the SME policy strategy (5.4), and the strategy to improve 
the business climate (5.5). The chapter ends with some preliminary conclusions (5.6). 
                                                 
16   Indicadores do Quadro de Avaliacao de Desempenho (QAD–PAF 2008–2010);  
 online: http://www.pap.org.mz /jr_08.htm, (accessed 9 Apr. 2009) 
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5.1 The povertyreduction strategy 
A relevant document that treats industrial policy issues is the global povertyreduction 
strategy paper, PARPA II (República de Moçambique 2006a). Its broad scope includes 
almost every aspect of economic and social development. More specific strategy papers 
mentioned in PARPA II are the Industrial Policy Strategy, the SME Strategy and the 
Business Climate Strategy (see below). Unlike PARPA I (2001–2006), which focused 
almost exclusively on the social sectors, PARPA II (2006–201017) acknowledges the im-
portance of economic growth for poverty reduction. Nevertheless, the main focus of 
PARPA II remains the social sectors, which receive the most funds. The objectives for 
economic development expressed in the document are to: (i) foster rural development; (ii) 
develop the national business community; and (iii) create an environment favourable for 
business investment. For example, one of its 13 priorities is promoting the expansion of 
agro-industrial and labour-intensive manufacturing activities, in particular of small and 
medium export-oriented businesses with great potential to add value and create new jobs 
(República de Moçambique 2006b, 34–35). 
Almost all national planning instruments, donor interventions and aid inflows are linked to 
the strategies and lines of action outlined in PARPA II. Since it is based on a national con-
sensus of the various interest groups, the document remains very general and does not set 
clear priorities.18 As a consequence, it is not suited to be a practical guide to the allocation 
of public resources. 
Moreover, until recently there was no formal system that linked the objectives and actions 
defined in PARPA II with the State planning and budgeting process. The Government of 
Mozambique’s annual development plan (Plano Económico e Social – PES)19 and the 
State budget, which drew on the Five-Year Plan approved by the national assembly, were 
created independently of PARPA II. PARPA II has recently been integrated into State 
planning and budgeting, and from 2009 on it is supposed to be in complete harmony with 
the country’s Five-Year Plan. 
The PARPA process formally opened some space for more participatory policy-
formulation and planning and is committed to make this an ongoing endeavour, involving 
representatives of the Government, the private sector, trade union confederations, civil 
society and donors (Fox 2008). An annual, participatory poverty assessment provides an 
alternative perspective on poverty in the country, usually aiming to present voices and 
perspectives of the poor. Although participation is an important first step, the impacts of 
the PARPA process remain very limited. Low capacity of both the Government and civil 
society impedes meaningful participatory monitoring and presents a major obstacle to ef-
fective civil-society participation (see also Section 4.2). 
                                                 
17   Originally from 2006 to 2009, then prolonged until 2010. 
18   If national interest is broadly defined as broadly as ‘poverty reduction’ or ‘accelerated growth’, it is 
 possible to have most social groups and organizations on board, for example. Such a definition of 
 the national interest is useless, however, from the point of view of supporting ownership, leadership 
 and commitment, because it offers no clear reference point for the political, social and economic 
 agenda (Castel-Branco 2008). 
19  The annual PES is basically a prevision for the following year that establishes quantitative and qualita-
tive goals for each sector, without links to other sectors. The targets are usually set independently by 
the line ministries. 
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5.2 Industrial policy strategy 
The so-called ‘Industrial Policy and Strategy’ that the Council of Ministers approved in 
July 2007, intends to stimulate production and productivity. It also supports the creation of 
conditions that allow for the introduction of new technologies, qualifications, ways of or-
ganising production, and products (República de Moçambique 2007a, 4). It takes a very 
broad and general approach, which gives the impression that the Government does not 
want to “miss anything” – instead of setting a clear, realistic focus. The strategy paper 
strikingly does not address the specific role of the mega projects and how they could stra-
tegically be used to boost economic development (APRM 2009, 165). 
The strategy recommends several selective industrialpolicy measures (see below). These 
recommendations are based on general principles, such as an industry’s ability “to mod-
ernize and develop rapidly” and to penetrate domestic and international markets; to posi-
tively contribute to the balance of payments (through exports or import substitution) and 
the State budget; to contribute to diversification, particularly of rural markets and produc-
tion; to maximise linkages and the use of national resources; and to contribute to employ-
ment and to the reduction of regional imbalances (República de Moçambique 2007a, 25). 
In particular, the following selective industrialpolicy approaches are highlighted: 
• “The development of linkages between the beneficiaries of industrial develop-
ment, encouraging them to organize into productive clusters in order to increase 
the productivity and efficiency of the entire value chain.  
• Focus on areas that have a major economic and social impact, such as for in-
stance the food-processing industry, with its capacity to maximize agricultural 
and fishery potential, and in turn providing multi–sectorial linkages, employ-
ment, and import substitution as well as increased and diversified exports. 
• The promotion of the vertical and horizontal integration of the food sector. 
• The promotion of industries that allow for the adequate and sustainable exploi-
tation of productive resources and capacities, such as industries for the process-
ing of timber and its derivatives, and industries producing construction materi-
als, among others.  
• The promotion of import substitution for the metal, the chemical and the con-
struction material industries. 
• The development and the strengthening of Free Zones with a view to attracting both 
capital and labour intensive industries” (República de Moçambique 2007a, 4). 
The strategy also includes some functional (non-selective) measures, like programmes to 
develop infrastructure services (energy, water and transport); vocational training pro-
grammes for technical capacity building and “the promotion of public-private partner-
ships for the development of technological services, alternative technology, information 
and industrial counselling” (República de Moçambique 2007a, 5). 
The document does not address whether the State has the capacity to design, coordinate 
and implement these industrial policy measures. The need to improve coordination and 
sharing of information among the authorities and stakeholders is recognised. But there is 
no mention of concrete actors or coordination platforms that would be responsible for im-
plementing the action plan. Moreover, the issue of how to finance the public investments 
needed to achieve the goals of the strategy (e.g., in infrastructure and vocational training 
programmes) is not addressed. (Hardly any resources are available from the national 
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budget, which means that these investments depend to a large degree on the availability of 
donor funds.) The paper also sketches a monitoring plan, but says nothing about one im-
portant challenge to the implementation and monitoring of the complex industrialpolicy 
approaches proposed: the public administration’s low capacity. 
The strategy paper further refers to sub-sector strategies (either already elaborated or to be elabo-
rated with the assistance of consultants), which thoroughly analyse the market potential and the 
conditions of the respective sectors, using international benchmarking along the value chain. 
One example is the sub-sector strategy for the textile industry (República de Moçambique 
2008b). But concrete policy measures and the actions necessary to boost textile production are 
not developed in the document, and there is no clear commitment discernable to provide the 
public and/or specific goods needed to transform the potentials analysed into practical results. 
5.3 SME policy strategy 
The “Strategy for the Development of Small and Medium Size Enterprises in Mozambique”, 
which was approved in August 2007 (República de Moçambique 2007b), results from the 
demands of PARPA II and the Industrial Development Strategy. Because of limited national 
experience and capacity, it was elaborated with the assistance of donors and external con-
sultants. Although CTA was consulted throughout the process of strategy formulation, pri-
vate sector representatives and Government officials were not able to agree on certain im-
portant elements. During the consultations, for example, private-sector participants advo-
cated for creating a non-governmental institute for SME promotion. But this was not in the 
interest of the Government, who decided to set up a State-owned SME institute (see below). 
The document underlines the important role of SMEs as drivers of employment, competi-
tiveness, diversification and innovation, as well as their role in mobilising social resources 
(República de Moçambique 2007b, 1; see also Kaufmann / Fungulane / Macamo 2008). 
The strategy analyses Mazambique’s status quo, its specific complex barriers and short-
comings to SME development – and defines objectives, priority measures and a sequence 
of actions. A State-owned SME institute, the Instituto para a Promoção das Pequenas e 
Médias Empresas (IPEME) was founded in 2008 to implement or facilitate the strategy. 
The lines of actions proposed in the strategy are threefold: 
1. improve the business environment for SMEs 
2. strengthen SMEs’ technological and management capacities 
3. give strategic support (e.g., to exporters and high-tech firms, etc.) 
The strategy emphasises that selective interventions are likely to fail unless the general 
business environment is improved. Thus, improvement of the business environment to 
create a level playing field and reduce the transaction costs for SMEs takes priority in se-
quence and importance. This item is high on the political agenda; currently, the introduc-
tion of a ‘negative licensing system’ to spur enterprise creation is being discussed. This 
basically means that any SME that applies for a license is automatically licensed unless 
the competent authority explicitly objects the application for justified reasons. Simplifica-
tion of the arbitrary inspection and tax systems is also part of the reforms.20 In 2008, a general 
“Strategy for Improving the Business Climate” was approved, which addresses these issues in 
detail (see below). 
                                                 
20   For more details on these and other barriers for SME development, see Krause et al. (2010). 
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Figure 2:  The SME development strategy 
 
Source:  República de Moçambique (2007b, 36) 
The second pillar, capacity development, will also include all sectors and regions. The 
newly founded IPEME is supposed to play an important role as facilitator here. Only the 
third pillar is selective. Its focus will be on growth drivers, such as export-oriented SMEs 
and high-tech companies, which would qualify for special credit lines or special credit-
guarantee conditions (República de Moçambique 2007b, 35ff). Figure 2 shows the 
planned system for SME development (República de Moçambique 2007b). Since both the 
strategy and IPEME are very recent, it is too early to evaluate their success. 
As conceived in the strategy, IPEME’s role is that of a facilitator and not one of an im-
plementer. The basic idea is that IPEME will facilitate access to private business-
development services. The strategy draws on lessons learned from prior unsuccessful ex-
periences in the area of SME support. The IDIL (Instituto de Desenvolvimento Local In-
dustrial)21 and FFPI (Fundo de Fomento à Pequena Industria)22, which, with its own advi-
sory staff and credit funds, took a more ‘implementing stance’, will be closed down.23  
                                                 
21   IDIL ran an incubator near Maputo and offered training courses to small-scale entrepreneurs and start-ups. 
22   FFPI gives credits up to USD 60,000 to SMEs. For more details, see Bogarello et al. (2004, 25).  
23   Although no impact assessments of IDIL and FFPI are available, no significant impact has been visible. 
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Besides providing information for SMEs (market information, business linkages, etc.), 
IPEME will apply instruments like interest-rate bonification24 with commercial banks and 
leasing institutes, credit guarantees, and matching grants facilitating access to business-
development services and credit for SMEs (República de Moçambique 2007c). Moreover, a 
think tank will be formed (in or out of the institute) to prepare policy papers and studies for 
identifying market failures and growth barriers for SMEs in the specific national context. 
Currently, talks with donors are being held to secure financing for these activities (see also Box 
1 for examples of major World Bank projects in the area of SME promotion). Confidence in the 
new institution still has to develop, and the Government must show that it has learned from pre-
vious failures to support SME activities. The fact that IPEME is conceived as a facilitator and 
that the private sector is to be involved in the institute’s steering committee, as well as in the 
elaboration of its action plan, are promising signals (República de Moçambique 2007c). 
 
Box 1:  Recent World Bank projects in the area of SME and private-sector development 
Like several other donors, the World Bank supports SME and private-sector development in Mozambique 
through various projects. Worthy of mention is the ‘Project for Entrepreneurial Development (PODE)’, 
which is managed through a separate project-implementation unit. PODE’s technical learning component 
helped hundreds of local SMEs (mostly around Maputo) to develop their business through a matching-
grant scheme that co-finances training sessions, consultancies, export promotion activities, etc. (Borga-
rello et al. 2004, 23). A welcome side effect was the increase in demand for businessdevelopment services 
in Maputo and the founding of new firms that offer these services. 
The recently approved ‘New Mozambique Competitiveness and Private Sector Development Project’ 
(2/2009) integrates various approaches, including selective industrialpolicy measures. The project’s vol-
ume of USD 25 million is far bigger than the Ministry’s (MIC) budget. Whether the project will cooperate 
with the new SME institute, IPEME, is still unclear. There is a certain risk of duplicating functions in the 
area of SME promotion. One project component aims at developing the competitiveness of SMEs through 
the provision of credit and technical assistance. Another component focuses on improving the general 
business environment and implementing the existing strategy for that purpose (see Section 5.5. below). A 
third component includes selective measures for certain regions and sectors. It plans to promote the tour-
ism sector in the province of Inhambane as a model and anchor province for tourism. A horticulture tech-
nological centre for the province of Nampula is also envisaged. As in the PODE case, project implementation is 
conducted by a special unit, which is linked to the MIC and headed by the former National Director for Indus-
try – who left the MIC to take up this post. 
Project management through special implementation units that are institutionally separate from the State 
administration or line ministries may be more efficient because these units are able to recruit qualified 
staff, assign a sufficient part of the budget for administration, monitoring and evaluations, and typically 
follow rigid rules for procurement. But this weakens the public administration because project implementa-
tion units create parallel structures and accountability relations, and tend to recruit Government employees by 
offering better salaries and incentives. In fact, given the huge project budgets, project implementation units in 
Mozambique can be more powerful than their ministerial counterparts. 
5.4 Investment promotion strategy 
Investment Law 4/93 is the main document that regulates investment procedures and in-
vestment incentives. The law aims at promoting domestic and foreign investment in gen-
eral, following what could be described as an ‘open-door-policy’ approach. Fiscal benefits 
are by far the most important (and often the only) instrument used for investment promo-
tion.  
                                                 
24   An instrument to achieve lower interest rates through providing grants. 
Matthias Krause / Friedrich Kaufmann 
32 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
The implementing agent for the promotion activities, both at the national and international 
levels, is the investment-promotion agency, the Centro de Promoção de Investimentos 
(CPI), which was created under the Ministry of Finance and Planning (now the Ministry of 
Planning and Development). The CPI’s most important operational function is to authorise 
investments and approve them for qualification of fiscal benefits. In addition, the agency 
acts as a ‘troubleshooter’ helping investors deal with the bureaucracy and comply with 
regulations. Moreover, the CPI proactively markets the country, with offices in Shanghai, 
Brussels, and South Africa. Presidential visits, international trade fairs, delegations and 
conferences, such as the World Economic Forum, are some of their working platforms.25  
The Investment Law guarantees equal treatment of all investors and explicitly mentions in-
ternational investors (Article 4). Nevertheless, labour regulations constitute a disincentive 
for foreign investors, in particular those that restrict the number of work authorizations for 
expatriates, thereby hampering the transfer of human capital and skills (DNAEP 2006). 
Aside from a few sectors that are reserved for public ownership26, private (foreign) in-
vestments are welcome and qualify for fiscal benefits – as long as they are approved by 
the CPI and fulfil seven out of 10 investment objectives. The 10 investment objectives of 
national interest are summarised in the following table: 
 
Table 5:  Investment objectives of national interest 
a)  The development, rehabilitation, modernisation or expansion of economic infrastructures for the 
operation of productive activities or for rendering services necessary for supporting productive eco-
nomic activities and promoting the country’s development;  
b)  The expansion and improvement of national production capacity or of capacity to render services 
 which support productive activities;  
c)   Contributing towards training, expansion, and development of national entrepreneurs and Mozambi
 can business partners;  
d)  The creation of jobs for national workers and the raising of professional skill levels of the Mozambi
 can labour force;  
e)   The promotion of technological development and the improvement of entrepreneurial productivity 
 and efficiency;  
f)   The increase and diversification of exports;  
g)  The rendering of productive services and of those generating foreign currency;  
h)  The reduction and substitution of imports;  
i)   Contributing towards improving the supply of domestic markets and the satisfaction of the priority 
 and basic needs of the population;  
j)   Any direct or indirect contribution towards improving the balance of payments and government 
 budget revenue. 
Source:  Investment Law 4/93, Art. 7 
                                                 
25   See also www.mozbusiness.gov.mz/index.php/about-cpi. 
26   Article 5 defines the national priorities (areas reserved for the public sector), namely: 
  a) the production of electrical energy for public consumption in accordance with the relevant legislation,  
  b) the public supply of water for domestic and industrial purposes in urban centres,  
  c) the operation of postal services and public telecommunications, 
 d) the development and operation of national parks, both marine and terrestrial, and of other areas 
 under protection by law, 
  e) the production, distribution and trade of arms and ammunition. 
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This broad formulation of objectives leaves space for the approval of almost any kind of 
investment. Fiscal benefits are partly differentiated by sector and geographic area, and on 
one occasion the CPI supported the creation of the Beluluane Industrial Park in a free zone 
(see below). Nevertheless, the CPI does not follow any clearly integrated strategy to target 
specific sectors with growth potential or promote the creation of industrial clusters, for 
example. Selective industrialpolicy approaches, like the ones discussed in the Industrial 
Development Strategy above, are mostly unknown to the CPI or are irrelevant in prac-
tice.27 One notable exception is the linkage programme around the MOZAL aluminium 
smelter that is coordinated by the CPI and the International Finance Corporation, (IFC; see 
the Case Study in Section 6.2). In general, the CPI works on an ad-hoc basis, trying to 
attract any kind of investment. One factor that hinders integrated approaches to investment 
promotion is the lack of public finance for investments in complementary public goods or 
infrastructure.  
Fiscal benefits are regulated in the code of fiscal benefits, which was reformulated in 2009 
(Law 4/2009). One objective of the reformulation was to increase Mozambique’s fiscal 
stability and reduce the extraordinary benefits for mega projects. The provisions for fiscal 
benefits are differentiated by geographical area and sector (see Table A2 in the Annex for 
an overview of the various fiscal benefits in Law 4/2009). The provisions include incen-
tives for de-concentration: since Maputo has by large received the greatest amount of in-
vestments, the Government is now trying to promote investment outside the capital by 
offering greater fiscal benefits to firms that invest in the ‘hinterland’. Basic infrastructure, 
rural commerce, rural industry and agriculture, manufacturing and tourism, as well as sci-
ence and technology parks, enjoy special fiscal regimes. 
Finally, the law also grants extraordinary fiscal benefits to free zones (Rapid Development 
Zones, Free Industrial Zones, Special Economic Zones – see Table A2). In 2007, there 
were 16 free-zone projects in Mozambique (Wide 2010, 22), including the Beluluane In-
dustrial Park outside Maputo (adjacent to MOZAL). So far, there is no evidence that the 
free zones have contributed to creating agglomeration economies and industrial clusters. 
Only a few firms have settled in Beluluane, for instance. 
5.5 Strategy for improving the business climate 
After many years of discussion, studies and pressure from the donors (the IMF, World 
Bank and bilateral donors), as well as from the private sector (the CTA and others), the 
Government elaborated a comprehensive strategy for improving the business climate that 
was approved in 2008 (MIC 2008b). It was personally backed by the President of Mozam-
bique with hearings with the private sector, and discussions in the Council of Ministers. 
MIC is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the strategy; the implementa-
tion plan is part of the public-sector-reform agenda that is supervised by the Comissão 
Interministerial da Reforma do Sector Público, or CIRESP, that is headed by the Prime 
Minister – which gives it a relatively high political profile. 
The approach is market oriented and inspired by the Doing Business reports of the World 
Bank Group (see Section 3.3). One Government motivation to implement this strategy was 
                                                 
27   Interview with Nuno Maposse (Table A4). 
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to raise Mozambique’s position in the Doing Business ranking. The strategy is functional 
(that is, non-specific) in the sense that it does not contain any measures targeted to specific 
regions or sectors. Its main objective is to level the playing field for businesses in general, 
and to reduce transaction costs. 
The strategy comprises four main lines of action: (i) to cut red tape and deregulate in many 
areas (import–export, the tax system, inspection, licensing and registering, and labour 
law); (ii) to reform businesses taxes and ease access to credit; (iii) to improve the energy 
infrastructure; and (iv) to strengthen property and investors’ rights (MIC 2008b). There 
are important links to the SME strategy presented above. Among the more than 100 spe-
cific activities still to be implemented under the SME strategy are the following: creation 
of a unified, simplified and non-punitive inspection system; simplification of the tax sys-
tem for SMEs; ongoing implementation and improvement of the programme for the crea-
tion of one-stop shops28 (for an empirical investigation of the effects of Doing-Business-
style reform on the formalisation and development of small enterprises in Mozambique, 
see Krause et al. 2010). 
There are several challenges to successfully putting the measures foreseen in the Busi-
ness Climate Strategy into practice. The low capacity and weakness of the public ad-
ministration is a handicap for the implementation of legal and regulatory reforms, espe-
cially outside Maputo.29 Another challenge is funding the reform measures: Some re-
forms are not very cost-intensive (e.g., a new decree that simplifies business registra-
tion), while others are (investments in the energy infrastructure). Another major chal-
lenge is the coordination and management of cross-sector tasks. Since many of the en-
visaged reforms concern more than one ministry and there will be winners and losers, 
success will depend on political will and management to push the reforms. For example, 
the new inspection system will redirect budgets, authority and manpower away from line 
ministries: one objective of the reforms is to reduce corruption through a more central-
ised and transparent inspection system that applies an educational approach (instead of a 
punitive approach based exclusively on fines). Strong resistance from the line ministries 
to the reform project was visible early on. 
The MIC is currently elaborating an implementation strategy and a monitoring system 
for the Business Climate Strategy with the help of a donor (see Borowczak 2008/2009). 
But the coordinating inter-ministerial working group has not been working effectively; 
its members apparently do not have the necessary support from their line ministries. 
Rules and means for the private sector to participate in the monitoring and implementa-
tion process still need to be developed. Experiences in Government – private-sector dia-
logue forums, such as the annual private-sector conference and the CTA working 
groups, have shown that the follow-up of reforms and the attribution of responsibilities 
are not always successful. 
                                                 
28   One-stop shops are government service centres where enterprises can complete different bureaucratic 
 regulatory procedures (e.g., register a business, obtain a license, pay taxes, etc.) at one place. 
29   To give just one example: The public administration in the provinces is often not informed about 
 reforms and follows outdated laws and regulations. 
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5.6 Preliminary conclusions 
The major strategy documents presented and discussed above are very recent, so little can 
be said about their successful implementation and impacts. When judging the strategies on 
paper, the first thing to note is that there are important lacunae: Despite the factual impor-
tance of mega projects, no strategy paper exists about how to use the mega projects to 
boost broad-based development,30 and despite the potential acknowledged by experts and 
the Government, there is also no comprehensive strategy document on the tourism sector 
(APRM 2009, 165, 170). In addition, concerns about the possible negative impacts of in-
dustrial development on environmental sustainability are not addressed in the strategy 
papers. It should be noted that most strategy papers say little about how to design monitor-
ing and evaluation tools. This means that during the implementation of the respective 
strategies, ‘learning cycles’ – which are necessary to achieve a ‘welfare-enhancing’, ‘effi-
cient’ and ‘up-dated’ industrial policy – are not really considered and reflected. A notable 
exception is the Strategy for Improving the Business Climate, which has a specific moni-
toring tool that was designed during the implementation. But in all cases, there still is no 
evaluation of impacts. Finally, the major strategy papers (Industrial Policy, SME Policy 
and Business Climate) would benefit from a greater elaboration of the link between the 
policy approaches that are outlined and the overall goal of poverty reduction. This could 
contribute to raising the awareness of key actors about the crucial role of economic and 
industrial policies in reducing poverty. 
In terms of the mix of selective and non-selective industrialpolicy approaches that the ma-
jor strategies propose, the balance tends to be in favour of the non-selective approaches. 
From a historical perspective, this can be explained by the fact that Mozambique did not 
fare well with its socialist economic policy, which was abandoned in the late 1980s, and 
that the major donors, who became very influential in the 1990s, were very inspired by the 
Washington Consensus, and thus reluctant to selective industrialpolicy approaches. Never-
theless, the strategy papers discussed contain important elements of selective approaches – 
most notably, the Industrial Policy Strategy, and to a lesser extent, the SME Policy Strat-
egy. Some objectives mentioned in this respect are maximization of the value added by 
promoting sectors that use local resources and labour-intensive technologies (such as the 
food industry); the promotion of export-oriented SMEs; and the promotion of linkages and 
cluster creation. However, overall, the strategy papers discussed do not present a coherent 
picture, do not address some important areas (see above), and lack a clear ‘vision’ (see also 
Castel-Branco 2008). 
This raises the question about the process of elaboration of these strategies, and their rela-
tion to the main industrialpolicy players’ interests and economic realities. Given the lack 
of capacity of the respective ministries and national stakeholders such as business associa-
tions, most of the strategy documents were produced with considerable technical assis-
tance by donors (among others, United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
[UNIDO], the World Bank, the African Development Bank [AfDB], and the GTZ). This 
fact partially explains their lack of coherence and calls into question the effectiveness of 
the big efforts of donors and the GOM in terms of harmonisation and coordination (see 
Section 4.3 above). 
                                                 
30   There is, however, one linkage programme in place that promotes linkages between SMEs and the 
 MOZAL aluminium smelter and other multinational enterprises (see Section 6.2). 
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More important than the incoherence of the industrial development strategies on paper, is 
the question whether the actors involved in implementation manage to make good and 
practical industrial policies to create and coordinate measures and incentives relevant for 
addressing the economy’s structural deficiencies and are effective in promoting productiv-
ity, competitiveness, and income generation. In this regard, it can be said that the institu-
tional capacity to design and coordinate such approaches – that typically require coopera-
tion across ministries or sectors and between different government levels, as well as by 
public and private actors – is generally low. Since colonial times in Mozambique, there 
has been a marked tendency towards sector and vertical planning, and far less for horizon-
tal coordination and integration.31 Moreover, the political elite’s willingness and incentives 
to implement welfare-enhancing industrial policies that promote broad-based growth is 
also in question: at least a part of this elite seems to care primarily about their own busi-
ness interests; institutions and actors that could check this elite and prevent corruption are 
weak (see Chapter 4). 
These questions related to the implementation and effects of practical selective-industrial 
policies are analysed in more depth in the following two case studies. 
6 Two case studies: the cashew industry and linkages promotion 
This chapter describes and assesses in detail the policies and policy management in two 
cases in which selective industrial policies are applied: the promotion of the cashew indus-
try and the promotion of linkages between the huge aluminium smelter, MOZAL, and 
local SMEs. The economic challenges, as well as the industrial policy approach, are de-
scribed for each case. An assessment of the success of the promotional measures and the 
quality of the industrial policy management follows. 
6.1 The promotion of the cashew industry32 
The promotion of the cashew industry is relevant to this study for the following reasons: 
first, Mozambique is abundant in both fertile land and rural labour, which is why the agro-
industry as a whole is considered a potential growth sector (see Section 3.4). Second, the 
country has a tradition in raw cashewnut (RCN) production and processing.33 For a brief 
period in the 1970s, Mozambique was the world’s largest RCN producer and processor. 
Third, the characteristics of the cashew sector suggest that expansion would lead to broad-
based growth since smallholders grow most of the cashew trees: one million peasant fami-
lies produce RCNs (INCAJU s. a., 3). Moreover, RCNs can be processed into cashew ker-
nels by using a labour-intensive technology. Therefore, expansion of the cashew industry 
                                                 
31   Interview with John Barnes (Table A4). 
32   This subchapter is an abridged and revised version of the paper “Industrial Policy in the Cashew 
 Sector in Mozambique“ (Krause / Kaufmann 2010). 
33   Here ‘processing’ means the transformation of RCNs into cashew kernels. This basically involves: 
 (i) roasting the RCNs, which is necessary to be able to cut the outer shell; (ii) cutting the outer shells 
 and retrieving the cashew kernels; (iii) peeling away the thin skin around the kernels; and (iv) package
 ing. For more details see Cramer (1999). 
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could potentially directly reduce poverty by generating cash income for farmers and also 
creating a significant number of jobs in processing factories (Benfica / Tschirley / Sambo 
2002, 4). 
The rest of this case study is organised as follows: first, the specific challenges for the 
structural transformation of the cashew industry are discussed (6.1.1, which includes a 
brief review of the recent history of the cashew sector). Then the cashew-policy 
framework and the industrial policy management are assessed against this background 
(6.1.2). 
6.1.1 Specific challenges to the development of the cashew industry 
The current state of the cashew industry 
During the last decades, Mozambique’s cashew sector was hit by several shocks, including 
the exodus of the Portuguese entrepreneurial know-how after independence (1975), the 
civil war (1982–1992), and the rapid liberalisation of the formerly highly protected proc-
essing industry in the 1990s. Today, Mozambique’s farmers produce just around 33 per-
cent of the historic peak of RCN production, and the domestic processing industry pro-
duces just 10 percent of the 1973 historic peak cashew-kernel production (see Box 2 for a 
historical overview of Mozambique’s cashew industry and policy). 
Conversely, the world market for cashews has expanded considerably during the last dec-
ades. The supply side is dominated by India, Vietnam and Brazil, which combined ac-
count for 90 percent of cashew-kernel exports, and Western African countries, which 
make the bulk of RCN exports (Technoserve, Inc. 2009; EDE Consulting 2005, 13–14). 
India, the USA and the EU dominate world demand. Because the USA and the EU do not 
have processing industries to transform RCNs into cashew kernels, they import all the 
cashew kernels consumed, or 65 percent of world imports (EDE Consulting 2005, 14). 
India, in contrast, has the world’s biggest processing industry and is the world’s biggest 
RCN importer; India’s processing capacity doubles domestic RCN production.34 Indian 
processors meet their huge domestic demand, and 40 percent of the international demand, 
for cashew kernels. 
Although nowadays Mozambique is an insignificant player in the world market (see 
Box 2), domestically, the cashew sector is still important: in 2007 an estimated one mil-
lion farmers were involved in RCN production, with around 6,000 workers employed in 
approximately 20 processing plants; cashew exports (both RCNs and cashew kernels) 
yielded a revenue of around USD 35 million (INCAJU 2008b), equivalent to about 2 per-
cent of the country’s export revenue, making cashews the sixth most important export 
good after aluminium at 61 percent (electricity is 7 percent; prawns, 6 percent; tobacco 
and sugar, 3 percent each; Condon / Stern 2009). 
                                                 
34  India’s processing capacity is 1.2 million-metric tons of RCNs, equivalent to roughly 300,000 metric 
tons of cashew kernels (The Hindu Business Line 2009). 
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Box 2:  The history of Mozambique’s cashew industry and policy 
In the 1970s, Mozambique was the world’s largest cashew producer, producing 40 percent of the world’s 
RCNs and providing 30 percent of the world’s cashew-kernel exports (see charts below). According to 
McMillan, Rodrik and Welch (2002, Annex), RCN production peaked in 1973 with 240,000 metric tonnes, 
of which around 210,000 tonnes were processed inside the country in big mechanised factories. Around 
that period, RCN production involved millions of peasant growers, the processing industry employed 
more than 10,000 workers (making it the fourth largest employer after railways, sugar, and textiles; Han-
lon 2000, 29), and cashew products represented 21.3 percent of Mozambique’s total exports (Leite 1999, 
3). Today, Mozambique is a small player in the world cashew market. Global RCN production (3.2 million 
metric tonnes in 2007; Technoserve, Inc. 2009) has expanded rapidly over the last two decades, thanks to 
dramatic production increases in Vietnam and Western African countries, while Mozambique’s production 
has declined to 78,000 metric tonnes (the yearly average from 2006 to 2008) – which is just about 33 per-
cent of the 1973 production. The volume of RCNs processed domestically has declined to 22,000 metric 
tonnes, around 10 percent of the volume processed in 1973 (our calculation based on INCAJU 2008b, 12). 
Mozambique 
Share of World RCN Production Share of World Cashew-Kernel Exports 
Source:  Technoserve, Inc. (2009) 
Mozambique achieved its dominant market position in the 1970s because of an industrial policy of the 
colonial Portuguese government that ‘stimulated’ – through obligation – the replanting of cashew trees 
and small farmers’ output (Technoserve, Inc. 2009); developed a mechanised national processing industry 
using tariffs to protect it from Indian processors; and regulated producer prices and margins throughout 
the cashew marketing chain (Leite 1999, 3; McMillan / Rodrik / Welch 2002, 4–5). After independence, 
the cashew industry declined because of the exodus of Portuguese managerial know-how and the adoption 
of central-planning-like policies. This situation was exacerbated by the civil war that caused the destruc-
tion of infrastructure facilities and a subsequent lack of reinvestments (INCAJU 2008a). 
From the late 1980s on, Mozambique gained access to external finance through the Bretton Woods Institu-
tions, which in turn meant that economic policy – including its cashew policy – began to be dominated by 
a ‘structural adjustment philosophy’. Under pressure from the World Bank (Hanlon 2000, 36), the Gov-
ernment dismantled the protections for the cashew processing industry. It lifted the ban on RCN exports 
that had been introduced in 1978, and substituted for it a tax on RCN exports that was stepwise reduced 
from 60 percent in 1991 to 14 percent in 1996–1997 (McMillan / Rodrik / Welch 2002, 6). Along with 
these trade reforms, in 1991 privatisation was begun. By 1994 all formerly State-owned processing plants 
had been sold to private investors. One consequence of the RCN trade liberalisation was the almost com-
plete collapse of the privatised national processing industry, meaning a loss of around 8,000 jobs accord-
ing to McMillan / Rodrik / Welch (2002, 22–23) or even 10,000 jobs, according to Hanlon and Smart 
(2008, 39). For farmers, liberalisation had a positive effect since it increased the farm-gate price for 
RCNs, and RCN traders were able to increase their mark-up. McMillan / Rodrik / Welch (2002, 1–3) 
estimate that on balance the reforms’ efficiency gains were insignificant and the increase in income for 
farmers (USD 5.30 per year per household) very modest. 
In reaction to the downturn of the processing industry, in 1999 the Mozambican Congress passed a law 
protecting the domestic processing industry with an export tax on RCNs (to be levied at between 18 and 
22 percent). Moreover, the law established that the funds raised through the export tax should be used to 
cover the expenses of the National Institute for Cashew Promotion (INCAJU, created in 1997), which is 
mandated to promote RCN production and processing. 
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Figure 3: The cashew value chain 
 
Source:  Technoserve Inc. (2009) 
Figure 3 shows the international cashew value chain. The stages: (i) RCN production; (ii) 
processing (the transformation of RCNs into cashew kernels): as well as (iii) domestic 
trade and export of RCNs and cashew kernels, take place in Mozambique. In the course of 
rebuilding the processing industry after its near collapse in 2001, labour-intensive Indian 
technology was introduced in Mozambique that uses manually operated devices to cut the 
outer shells of the RCNs. Apart from a small volume that is produced for the domestic 
final-consumer market, the processing that takes place in Mozambique excludes the final 
processing stage (roasting, salting, and final packaging of cashew kernels). Nevertheless, 
the last two stages of (a) roasting/salting/final packaging and (b) retail/distribution – that 
are dominated by American, European, and Indian firms – make up as much as 80 percent 
of the final consumer price for whole cashew kernels, whereas the earlier stages account 
for merely 20 percent (Technoserve, Inc. 2009; Francisco / Barrenho 2008, 7–8). One 
characteristic feature of the cashew value chain is that it is hardly vertically integrated 
(Cramer 1999, 1256). 
The challenges 
The challenges to structural transformation of the cashew sector depend on the desired 
developmental goals. From the available strategic documents (INCAJU 2008a; 2008b) and 
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the cashew- policy framework itself (see below), it’s clear that the Government’s goals are 
to promote productivity, jobs and income relying on the development of the domestic 
processing industry as one centrepiece of the strategy (an alternative approach would be to 
promote RCN production relying on RCN exports alone). This approach of extending the 
domestic value chain35 is coherent with the objectives stated in PARPA II (to promote the 
expansion of agro-industrial and labour-intensive manufacturing activities; República de 
Moçambique 2006a, 34–35) and the Industrial Policy Strategy (to focus on areas with ma-
jor economic and social impacts, such as the food-processing industry; República de 
Moçambique 2007a, 4 – for more details, see Chapter 5). 
Since the domestic market for cashew kernels is negligible, this strategy can only succeed 
if the Mozambican processing industry is able to compete in the world market and pene-
trate large, open export-consumer markets (those of the USA and the EU being the most 
important).36 This implies various challenges along the cashew value chain concerning the 
upstream stages, the processing stage itself, as well as the downstream stages: 
The upstream stages 
Here, the crucial issue from the processing industry’s point of view is to source RCNs in 
sufficient quality and quantity at a competitive price. In Mozambique, however, there are 
problems with both quality and quantity. The outturn (pounds of sellable kernels per 80 kg 
bag of RCNs) in Mozambique is low (42 to 46) compared with the world’s leading pro-
ducers (India and Vietnam: 50 to 56; Francisco / Barrenho 2008, 48). The low average 
quality of RCNs partly has to do with poor post-harvesting handling, but mostly with low-
tech farming practices. RCN production levels have stagnated lasting recent years. This is 
due to several factors: the cashew orchard has high percentages of old trees and trees 
plagued with diseases and pests. Small farmers produce almost all37 of Mozambique’s 
RCNs. Many of these small farmers just ‘collect’ RCNs instead of actively ‘farming’ 
(planting, pruning, spraying and spreading manure), which results in very low productivity 
per tree (2 to 4 kg RCNs – less than half of the attainable levels of 8 to 10 kg; INCAJU 
s. a., 6; Technoserve, Inc. 2009). Consequently, the challenges consist of investing in re-
planting cashew trees and maintaining them to increase productivity, as well as in improv-
ing post-harvesting handling. 
A further problem for the processing industry is to manage to buy RCNs on the market at 
competitive prices. Although the 18 percent export tax on RCNs (see more on the export 
tax below) gives the domestic processing industry a competitive edge, it has to compete 
with big traders who mainly export RCNs to India. These RCN traders possess a dense net 
of well-established rural trading posts.38 One challenge for processors lies in building reli-
able supply networks and trusty trade relations with RCN brokers or farmers’ associa-
                                                 
35   More precisely, preserving the extension of the domestic value chain that had existed since the 1970s. 
36   India also has a huge consumer market for cashew kernels. However, it is highly protected against 
 cashew-kernel imports. 
37   According to a source cited by Francisco / Barrenho (2008, 48) as much as 98 percent of RCNs are 
 produced by small farmers. 
38   Insight gained in an interview with Yunuss A. Gafar (Table A4). 
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tions.39 (From the processing industry’s point of view, the alternatives are to invest either 
in contract farming schemes or in their own cashew plantations. Benfica / Tschirley / 
Sambo 2002 conclude that the prospects for the former’s success are poor due to a high 
risk of default40, and that the latter is not desirable from a povertyreduction perspective.) 
The other challenge for the processing industry consists in getting sufficient short-term 
capital at affordable interest rates to finance RCN purchases during the harvesting season. 
The processing stage 
Access to short-term credit in sufficient quantity and at affordable interest rates is proba-
bly one of the processors’ most important challenges, since the working-capital require-
ments for buying RCNs are extremely high (typically between USD 0.5 and 2.5 million, 
depending on the processing capacity). Compared with RCN traders and Indian proces-
sors, Mozambican processors are at a competitive disadvantage because they have to 
commit more working capital: They buy the whole stock during the Mozambican harvest-
ing season and transform it into sales revenue spread throughout the year. In contrast, 
traders do not need to keep their stock for such a long period, and Indian processors man-
age to shorten stock-keeping by sourcing from several regions of the world with different 
harvesting seasons. Moreover, Mozambican processors typically depend on the poorly 
developed domestic banking sector to arrange for credit, whereas RCN traders enjoy ac-
cess to commercial credit from their Indian trade partners41 and Indian processors have 
access to a well-developed financial sector and a dense net of trading partners. 
Another challenge is the low productivity of Mozambican workers. This is partly due to 
high rates of absenteeism, which in many cases is caused by malaria (Technoserve, Inc. 
2009). According to one factory owner, absenteeism is around 30 percent42; according to 
Francisco / Barrenho (2008, 66) it is as much as 50 percent. One factory owner reported 
that because of low labour productivity, he was starting to mechanise. An additional chal-
lenge to factories’ competitiveness is the relatively rigid labour legislation.43 Finally, 
weaknesses in the business environment such as poor transport, water and communica-
tions infrastructures, tend to increase production costs. 
The downstream stages 
The international trading environment for cashew kernels is highly imperfect. According 
to Cramer (1999, 1255) the competitive assets of successful exporting firms are quality 
standards and management, market and technical information, as well as established input 
supplies and final output-buyer networks. A precondition for supplying the high-end con-
                                                 
39   In recent years, more and more farmers’ associations have emerged (in many cases with the support 
 of development cooperation), but they are still not widespread and typically have weak institutional 
 capacities. Interview with Martin Mason (Table A4) and with representatives from the Fórum Naihava, 
 a union of various farmers’ associations in the district of Mogovolas, province of Nampula (Table A4). 
 Cf. also Francisco / Barrenho (2008, 47) and Hanlon / Smart (2008, Chapter 3). 
40   Farmers can always sell their production to RCN exporters if they offer better prices than the processors. 
41   The trade relations between Mozambique-based RCN traders and Indian traders are reinforced by ethnic ties. 
42   Interview with Felipe Miranda (Table A4). 
43   On this topic, cf. also Krause et al. (2010, 98).  
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sumer markets in the USA and the EU is to build trustful relations with the huge output 
buyers that command the supply of retail markets, and to invest in quality management so 
as to comply with the high standards of product quality and quantity, timing and reliability 
that these buyers demand. With international development cooperation support, a group of 
Northern Mozambican processors founded a jointly owned export-service company, Agro 
Industrias Associadas (AIA), and have been successful in penetrating this high-end market 
through a cashew-kernel broker based in the Netherlands (Technoserve, Inc, 2009). De-
spite this success, other processors still do not enjoy well-established quality management 
systems and final output-buyer networks. An alternative, or complementary, final con-
sumer market to be explored is South Africa, which imports cashew kernels in significant 
quantities. Mozambican exports enjoy duty-free access to the South African market. Nev-
ertheless, just as for Europe and the USA, good buyer relations have to be built up, and the 
required quality standards have to be met, in order to take advantage of this potential mar-
ket. 
Moreover, at least theoretically, there is potential to further enlarge the domestic-cashew 
value chain. Given the significant value added in the final processing (roasting/flavouring) 
and packaging stage, this market is attractive to the Mozambican cashew industry. How-
ever, this market has even higher entry barriers (additional standards like food safety and 
hygiene standards, timing, sales management). 
6.1.2 Assessment of the cashew policy and the industrial policy management 
The cashew policy framework and its main actors 
The GOM’s current cashew-policy framework can be characterized by the following 
measures at the macro (a) and meso levels (b and c) (INCAJU 2008a): 
a. An export tax of 18 to 22 percent on the FOB export price of RCNs (currently 18 
percent), with tax revenues used to finance the promotion activities mentioned be-
low 
b. Promotion of RCN production: research, nurseries for improved varieties, pests and 
disease management and extension services (80 percent of export-tax revenues) 
c. Promotion of the cashew processing industry: credit guarantees (20 percent of ex-
port-tax revenue), as well as business and technical advisory services. 
From a formal perspective, the National Institute for Cashew Promotion (INCAJU) is the 
key cashew-strategy actor, since it is responsible for designing, monitoring and, in some 
cases, implementing the promotional activities. INCAJU, which depends on the Ministry 
of Agriculture, was created in 1997 and has its own legal identity and budget.44 The strat-
egy for the promotional activities was set out in a master plan for the period from 2000 to 
2005. By August 2009, this master plan had not yet been actualised, which means that 
INCAJU’s recent work has been based on an outdated strategy.45 Further Government ac-
                                                 
44   See also the institutional information on INCAJU’s website: http://www.incaju.gov.mz. 
45   Information gained in interviews with Jake Walter and Raimundo Matule (Table A4). 
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tors involved in cashew-policy making are the Ministry of Agriculture and the MIC (the 
latter only concerning the export tax). 
Donors play an important role in supporting the promotion of the cashew industry through 
technical and financial assistance, the most important being United States Agency for In-
ternational Development (USAID), the African Development Bank, the EU, and the 
Swiss, Dutch, and French Cooperations.46 Important NGOs, consulting firms and banks 
that are engaged in promotional activities include Technoserve, Inc., GAPI (a business and 
financial services provider), CLUSA (an NGO that promotes farmers’ associations and 
provides extension services), and BCI Fomento (one of Mozambique’s major commercial 
banks that implements two subsidised credit lines for processors, see below). Another or-
ganisation worth mentioning is the AICAJU, the national association of the Mozambican 
cashew processors and traders, which mainly engages in lobbying. (Smallholding cashew 
farmers lack a significant lobbying organisation.) 
With regard to the promotional activities aiming at the RCN production stage, research is 
conducted by the Mozambican Institute for Agricultural Research (IIAM), which has fo-
cused on growing improved varieties of cashew trees (with increased tolerance of pests 
and diseases and precocious production) and has certified several clones for replanting and 
propagation. INCAJU, with its own staff and facilities, grows seedlings of the improved 
varieties in several nurseries located in the main cashew-producing regions and distributes 
them to farmers. Seedlings are sold at cost price, and smallholders and farmers associa-
tions enjoy special discounts. Moreover, INCAJU sponsors a subsidised spraying scheme 
of self-employed small operators and service providers who charge a fee to farmers for 
spraying their cashew trees. 
There are also a series of donor-financed activities underway, mainly carried out by 
NGOs such as the Cooperated League of the United States of America (CLUSA), which 
include extension services and technical assistance for cashew farmers, especially with 
respect to the promotion of farmers’ associations. Some of these approaches – such as 
those of CLUSA and GAPI – have been inspired by a value-chain perspective that seeks 
to strengthen linkages between farmers, traders and processors. 
With regard to promotional activities targeting the cashew processing stage, two credit 
lines are available for processors, both offered by BCI Fomento. The first credit line, 
guaranteed by INCAJU, is for long-term investment in fixed assets such as land, buildings 
and machinery. In 2007, a total of USD 1 million was disbursed under this credit line 
(INCAJU 2008a, 19); the overall default rate since the creation of the credit line is 15 per-
cent. The second credit line, with annual disbursements of USD 10 to 12 million, is guar-
anteed by USAID. It aims at providing much-needed working-capital financing for proc-
essors during the harvesting season. This credit line has shown a default rate of 3 percent 
since its creation in 2003.47 
                                                 
46  According to information obtained in an interview with Carlos Costa (see Table A4), aid for the 
cashew sector in recent years totalled ca. USD 250 to 300 million.  
47   Information on the default rates (as of 2009) was obtained in an interview with a representative from 
 BCI Fomento who is not listed in Table A4 for reasons of confidentiality.  
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There have also been a series of programmes, mainly financed by donors (USAID and the 
Dutch and Swiss Cooperations, among others), that aim at rebuilding the processing in-
dustry after its almost complete collapse around 2001. Technoserve, Inc. (and to a lesser 
degree, GAPI) played major roles in designing and implementing these programmes by 
engaging in processor start-up assistance and finance, business and management training, 
definition and establishment of industry standards, Government lobbying, institutional 
support (for example, with respect to the creation of the export-service company AIA) and 
attempts to link processing to RCN production (Technoserve Inc. 2009; Simonetti / Wuyts / 
Wuyts-Fivawo 2007). Technoserve, Inc. also provided the GOM with strategic policy ad-
vice and advocated for the introduction of the labour-intensive Indian processing technol-
ogy in Mozambique. 
An assessment of the cashew strategy and the industrial policy management 
The cashew strategy 
Is the GOM’s cashew-policy framework successful at creating jobs and income for farm-
ers, workers and factories, promoting the expansion of the processing industry, and ad-
dressing and overcoming the main challenges outlined above? When Mozambique’s pre-
sent production and job figures are compared with the historical peak in the mid 1970s, or 
with the figures of today’s leading cashew producers (see Section 6.1.1), it appears that 
the cashew strategy is not successful. The picture changes when the year 2001, which co-
incides with the almost complete collapse of the processing industry, is used as the 
benchmark. Technoserve, Inc. (2009) provides an analysis of the economic impact48 of the 
redevelopment of the processing industry at several stages of the cashew value chain for 
the period from 2001 to 2008. The study concludes that this redevelopment has had a posi-
tive net-economic impact. The growth of the processing industry in this period (from one 
factory in 2001 to 16 factories in 2008) implies net economic benefits for the processing 
firms (profits), for the workers employed in the factories (wage income), for the RCN- 
producing farmers (through higher demand for RCNs, which resulted in higher farm-gate 
prices), and for local communities (as a result of the cash income generated by farmers 
and workers). It has implied net losses for RNC traders (slimmer spread of farm-gate and 
export prices due to competition from processing factories) and for the Government (fore-
gone tax income because of a decrease in RCN exports). Nevertheless, according to the 
study, the net effect is positive (USD 4 million for the period from 2001 to 2008; Tech-
noserve Inc. 2009, 62). 
Another way of assessing the cashew-policy framework is to analyse whether or not it 
addresses the main challenges outlined in Section 6.1.1 and helps tackle them. In general, 
the framework does address several of the challenges, for example, those regarding re-
planting and intensification of maintenance, or the provision of working-capital financing 
for processors. Another question, however, is if cashew policies effectively tackle these 
challenges. This is assessed below.49 
                                                 
48   The study is limited to the private economic benefits and losses and does not consider social benefits 
 and losses, such as the price effect of the RCN export tax, the cost of the promotion activities them-
 selves etc. 
49   Based on interviews and in the literature cited. 
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Given the high entry barriers to the consumer markets of the EU and the USA, the estab-
lishment of the AIA export-service company, the introduction of the cashew-kernel brand 
‘Zambique’ (owned by AIA), the introduction of quality standards for producing and han-
dling cashew kernels, and the establishment of stable buyer relations with a broker based 
in Rotterdam can be considered a success. Donor-financed technical assistance has con-
tributed to these achievements, whereas the involvement of INCAJU and other Govern-
ment agencies in these activities was rather marginal. 
The effectiveness of the financial services provided to processors can be assessed as 
‘mixed’. The credit line guaranteed by INCAJU to provide investment financing has re-
payment problems. According to several interview partners, one reason for this is that in 
several cases INCAJU has intervened so that loans were assigned according to political 
and not technical criteria. The other, much bigger credit line guaranteed by USAID that is 
intended to finance working capital, shows no significant repayment problems. Neverthe-
less, two interview partners stated that despite the latter credit line, processors enjoy less 
favourable financing conditions than some RCN traders and exporters, a factor that consti-
tuted an unfair competitive disadvantage. They claimed that, in addition to the RCN trad-
ers’ and exporters’ advantages mentioned in Section 6.1.1 (challenges to the processing 
stage), there was a scheme of illegal RCN exports to India that evaded the export tax and 
foreign exchange control, which in turn was linked to illegal imports of consumer goods 
from India (evading the import tax and the value-added tax – VAT), as well as to illegal 
exports of the national currency.50 Such a scheme would give the traders and exporters 
involved access to foreign exchange and to commercial credit at much more favourable 
rates than the ones offered by the special credit line for Mozambican processors. 
One important challenge, the low productivity of workers, is not addressed in the cashew-
policy framework. Important issues here are training and alphabetisation of workers as 
well as improvements of the rural health care services. Schooling, training and health care 
services attached to processing factories could play an important role for improving the 
situation. 
Despite the big efforts made and the substantial resources invested by INCAJU in seedling 
production, replanting and maintenance of trees as well as in disease control and extension 
services (INCAJU 2008a), the measures aiming at increasing RCN production and RCN-
farming productivity have not been effective. This is not to deny partial achievements, 
such as IIAM’s successful growing of improved varieties, but the bottom line is that RCN 
production in Mozambique has been stagnating for years (Technoserve, Inc. 2009, 80). 
This means that assuming RCN exporters are able to maintain their market share, the 
growth of Mozambican processors is constrained by the scarcity of domestic RCNs. 
A major bottleneck is the distribution and successful replanting of the seedlings grown in 
INCAJU-managed nurseries: only a small share of the seedlings grown is successfully 
replanted and survives the first few years (here logistics and timing/coordination with the 
rainy season, as well as know-how and maintenance, are key). The problem is com-
pounded by the factors of a poor rural-transport infrastructure and a farm structure that is 
                                                 
50   Information from two interview partners is not listed in Table A4 for confidentiality reasons. However, 
 this information has been cross-checked and confirmed with other interviewees. Regarding the evasion 
 of the export tax and the involvement of customs authorities, see also Maculuve (2006). 
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characterized by an abundance of dispersed smallholders engaged in subsistence farming 
and a scarcity of productive associations or commercial farmers. Moreover, according to 
some interview partners, the INCAJU management has used seedling distribution to farm-
ers to gain political support for FRELIMO several times, particularly before elections, 
without regard for the negative impacts on the effectiveness of replanting measures.51 
Consequently, Technoserve, Inc. (2009) recommends that replanting schemes should be 
led by the private sector. This would probably result in more targeted replanting efforts 
near existing processing factories, in collaboration with farmers’ associations or commer-
cial farmers. Individual commercial farmers as well as farmers’ associations can play im-
portant roles as multipliers of knowledge and best-farming practices, and help to increase 
RCN producers’ bargaining power and create linkages with traders and processors.52 
Still other factors hamper investments in farming and replanting: In general, the invest-
ment climate for farming is poor, in particular in what refers to the difficult access to, and 
the insecurity of, land and property rights, the widespread theft of RCNs (particularly 
when grown in plantations), the lack of rural credit, and poor transport and irrigation infra-
structure (see also Section 3.4). It is difficult to imagine that many effective farmers’ asso-
ciations and commercial farmers will be able to develop without an improvement in the 
investment climate for farming activities. 
Finally, the export tax has an ambiguous effect. While it gives Mozambican processors – 
as compared with RCN exporters – a competitive edge, for farmers, it also means a loss of 
income because it reduces farm-gate prices and constitutes a disincentive for investing in 
RCN farming. From a welfare perspective, this can only be justified if the benefits associ-
ated with cashew processing exceed the losses that accrue to farmers.53 In any case, as the 
processing industry grows in competiveness, the Government should gradually reduce the 
tax so as to reduce the burden on smallholders. Alternatively, the tax should be abolished 
right away and a substitution found for less distortive promotional measures. 
Industrial policy management 
Overall the GOM’s capability in industrial policy management with regard to cashew 
promotion is judged as weak. 
First, it is striking to note that the GOM, mainly through INCAJU, has been less involved 
in the more successful promotional activities – for instance, those related to promoting 
downstream linkages, which have been basically donor-driven – and more involved in the 
less successful, such as the promotion of investment financing for processors and RCN pro-
duction. 
Second, INCAJU does not possess the intellectual leadership as far as cashew policies in 
Mozambique are concerned. Instead, intellectual leaders are the specialized business-
                                                 
51   I.e. factors like coordination with the rainy season and capacity of farmers to replant seedlings success-
 fully were disregarded. 
52   Effective farmers’ associations or commercial farmers are, however, scarce (see above), which means 
 that in many cases, associations and farmers will need assistance to become effective. 
53   McMillan / Rodrik / Welch (2002) assess the welfare effect of the liberalisation of the cashew sector 
 in the 1990s, and conclude that positive and negative effects more or less outweighed each other. 
 See also Box 2. 
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services providers such as Technoserve, Inc. and GAPI. Moreover, INCAJU does not ap-
pear to have a clear strategic vision for the cashew sector, as is illustrated by the fact that 
in August 2009, the GOM was still working with the old 2000 to 2005 Master Plan, and 
had not managed to update its strategy. 
Third, the way seedling distribution is managed indicates that INCAJU has been partially 
directed by FRELIMO party interests, and that some of the promotional activities follow 
political rather than technical rationales. This is corroborated by the fact that some inter-
view partners perceive INCAJU’s top management as politicized and driven by party in-
terests.54 
Fourth, indications were given in interviews that there is a scheme of RCN export-tax eva-
sion and of illegal exports of the national currency that damages the competitiveness of the 
domestic-processing industry and lowers tax revenues. It is inconceivable that such a 
scheme could operate without being backed by powerful actors from the political elite.55 
This means that the Government’s official cashew-promotion policy seems to be under-
mined by corrupt activities apparently backed by the political elite. 
Fifth, the GOM shows weaknesses in coordinating the policies that affect the cashew 
value chain (which often involve sub-national levels of government) and in establishing 
effective platforms to engage with industry representatives. For example, the Government 
undertakes hardly any coordinated efforts to improve the local investment climate for 
cashew farming and processing (health care, training and education, access to land-use 
rights, local infrastructure, etc.). Although INCAJU facilitates a cashew-policy dialogue 
with the processing industry that is represented by AICAJU and other important stake-
holders like the cashew-workers union and farmers’ representatives, interview partners 
from the processing industry maintain that tangible results from these policy dialogues 
have been scant (in one case, it was not possible to improve enforcement of the RCN ex-
port tax). 
Sixth, concerning monitoring and evaluation, and the availability of transparent informa-
tion in this regard, the publicly available reports of INCAJU on this matter (INCAJU 
2008b; INCAJU s. a.) inform about outputs and activities – but not impacts. Public infor-
mation on the performance of the guarantee fund backed by INCAJU is scarce or non-
existent. 
6.2 The promotion of linkages between FDI and local SMEs: the MOZAL case 
As concluded in Section 3.5, one of the Mozambican economy’s major problems is that 
there are hardly any businesses that succeed in supplying high-value (foreign) markets. 
Therefore, one conceivable industrial-development strategy would be to use FDI to attract 
the capital and know-how necessary to build competitive firms and to maximise knowl-
edge spillovers, as well as job and income generation, through promoting linkages be-
tween foreign firms and local SMEs. In Chapter 5, the review of the major strategy docu-
ments showed that despite having investment promotion, SME policy and industrial policy 
                                                 
54   However, other interview partners assessed the work of INCAJU more positively.  
55   On this topic see also Maculuve (2006). 
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strategy in place, none of these documents provides clear strategic guidance on how to use 
the mega projects to maximise the desirable development effects. 
A member of the group of least-developed countries, Mozambique has become a major 
recipient of FDI in recent years (Robbins / Lebani / Rogan 2008, 20). FDI has mainly 
taken the form of large capital-intensive mega projects in the mining and energy sector, 
which limits the potential to create positive development effects on the local economy 
through linkages with SMEs. This section reviews and assesses the practical experience 
with linkage promotion around FDI projects in the mining and energy sector, based on a 
programme that promotes linkages between Mozambique’s largest and oldest mega pro-
ject, the MOZAL aluminium smelter located near Maputo, and local SMEs. 
6.2.1 Specific challenges and promotional measures 
In the context of linkage promotion around a huge FDI project like MOZAL, there are two 
consecutive steps to the challenges and promotion measures: first, the attraction of FDI 
itself, and second, the creation of linkages with local SMEs. Although this case study em-
phasises the second step, the first is also briefly addressed. 
Attracting FDI 
As pointed out in Section 3.2, the MOZAL aluminium smelter-investment project on the 
outskirts of Maputo, which was started in 1998, was the first massive FDI project after the 
civil war and can be considered the showcase that brought Mozambique back on the inter-
national investors’ radar and “led the Wall Street Journal to declare the country ‘an Afri-
can success story’” (APRM 2009, 163). The smelter – which transforms alumina into 
aluminium ingots – was built in two phases: the core smelter, MOZAL I, was completed 
in 1998, and the MOZAL II expansion in 2001. It involved an investment of about USD 
2.4 billion, of which the IFC provided USD 133 million. MOZAL generates 42 percent of 
Mozambique’s export revenues, which have increased the country’s GDP by between 3.2 
and 5 percent. MOZAL is owned by: BHP-Billiton (66 percent), the South African Indus-
trial Development Corporation (20 percent), Mitsubishi (12 percent) and the GOM (2 per-
cent) (APRM 2009, 163–164; IFC 2004, 61). The investment project included not just the 
plant itself but also a substantial upgrading of infrastructure (roads, telecommunications, 
electricity, water and sewerage, and harbour; Thomas 2005, 7). 
The biggest challenges to attracting such massive investment were the generally poor in-
vestment climate in Mozambique (see Section 3.3) and the low investor confidence in the 
mid-1990s, since there was no precedent for such a huge investment project. The Gov-
ernment strategy to deal with these challenges involved two main packages of measures:  
• Huge fiscal benefits: MOZAL enjoys a series of extremely generous56 tax benefits, 
including those codified in the Free Industrial Zone Legislation, approved in 1997 
just before the start of the project. MOZAL has been granted tax exemptions for 50 
years (!), including exemptions on paying duties on imports and value-added tax, as 
well as the limitation of corporate taxes to one percent of sales, which means that 
                                                 
56   “The most generous in Africa”, according to a government official cited by APRM (2009, 163). 
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Government revenues from the project are very modest (APRM 2009, 164; see also 
Hartley / Otto 2008). 
• Preferential treatment: In the Government agencies involved with the project, special 
task forces were created to coordinate the necessary permits and licenses, and addi-
tional bureaucratic acts and non-standard procedures were applied to provide these 
Government services to compensate for the weak capacity of the public administra-
tion and the cumbersome standard procedures. 
Linkage promotion 
Although, as pointed out above, with the attraction of mega projects like MOZAL the 
GOM did not follow a clear strategy that would promote FDI so as to maximise positive 
economic impacts on the local economy,57 in 1997 the Government – with support from 
the World Bank Group – did conceive a plan to promote linkages between transnational 
corporations and local SMEs so as to increase the benefits from FDI projects (Robbins / 
Lebani / Rogan 2008, 22–23). MOZAL was the first, and continues to be by far the most 
important, case in which this concept was applied. The motivations for MOZAL to par-
ticipate in a linkage-promotion project “were largely the Public Relations benefits of en-
gaging with the local economy and the potential for increased flexibility in terms of deliv-
ery times and sustainability gained from contracting locally” (Robbins / Lebani / Rogan 
2008, 25). The linkage-promotion project designed and implemented by the Mozambican 
investment promotion agency, CPI, and the IFC in partnership with MOZAL, was started 
in 2001 at the time of constructing the smelter expansion, MOZAL II.  
The facilitation of supply relations and other linkages between MOZAL and local 
SMEs encountered numerous challenges. This was evidenced by the fact that in 1998, 
during the construction phase of MOZAL I, participation by Mozambican firms was 
minimal. As described in Section 3.3, Mozambique’s economy is characterised by a 
low level of intra- and inter-firm linkages and a low level of technological develop-
ment of businesses, including low quality management (República de Moçambique 
2007b). In particular, the domestic metalworking market was and still is marked by a 
very thin and dispersed industrial base of formal enterprises, which makes generation 
of industrial linkage extremely difficult. Moreover, the poor business environment, 
including difficult access to finance, as well as the strong competition from informal 
businesses and foreign imports leaves room for only a very few, competitive, formal 
SMEs to qualify as business partners for MOZAL (Warren-Rodriguez 2008, 20). A 
CPI study in preparation for the linkage promotional activities that screened 370 firms 
to analyse if they could upgrade to meet MOZAL standards showed that “99% had 
serious problems with product quality; 95% did not have the required profile, experi-
ence and portfolio of projects; 92% operated with old, worn-out and outdated equip-
ment and technology; 90% suffered from serious management deficiencies and inade-
quate financial structure and capabilities; and 85% had serious deficiencies with re-
spect to marketing capabilities and business attitude” (Castel-Branco and Goldin 
2003, 24). A further challenge was that the standard contracts that MOZAL offered 
were far too large to be carried out by Mozambican SMEs (Robbins / Lebani / Rogan 
2008, 28). 
                                                 
57  E.g., by encouraging particularly labour-intensive FDI projects or FDI projects with marked local back-
ward and forward linkages. 
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The linkage programme involved three phases: SMEELP (SME Empowerment Linkages 
Program), initiated in 2001; Mozlink I, initiated in 2003; and Mozlink II, initiated in 2007 
(Robbins / Lebani / Rogan 2008, 22–25; USAID 2009, 4; IFC 2004, 61; Jaspers / Mehta 
2007, 8–11): 
• SMEELP was sponsored and implemented by MOZAL, the CPI and the IFC. Its main 
objective was to help local firms win contracts for the construction phase of the MO-
ZAL plant expansion. The measures involved the redesign and unbundling of large 
contracts into smaller ones; reformulation of procurement standards in order to allow 
local firms to comply with standards; creation of a firm database and screening of 
firms regarding their potential to do business with MOZAL; facilitation of access to, 
and exchange of, information; training of high-potential SMEs prior to bidding; and men-
toring SMEs who won contracts. Capacity-building measures were mainly delivered 
through matching grants.  
• Mozlink I was set up to replicate the results achieved through SMEELP and to expand 
linkages between MOZAL and local SMEs to the smelter’s operational phase. Beyond 
the activities included in SMEELP, the measures encompassed the promotion of addi-
tional businessdevelopment and financial services: local consultants were trained in the 
technical areas in which SMEs needed capacity building in order to do business with 
MOZAL, and specific financing products for SMEs were developed by banks and fi-
nancial institutions. 
• Mozlink II was the continuation of Mozlink I. The programme was expanded to in-
clude further transnational companies: Coca-Cola, Sasol (gas) and Cervejas de 
Moçambique (the country’s largest beer brewery). 
The linkage programme was complemented in 2005 with the opening of the 660-hectare 
Beluluane Industrial Park adjacent to the MOZAL smelter. The park, which is a CPI ini-
tiative and enjoys ‘Industrial Free Zone’ status, was created to support an industrial cluster 
around MOZAL (Robbins / Lebani / Rogan 2008, 22). It is a rare – and perhaps the only – 
example in Mozambique, where both land and infrastructure were prepared in order to 
offer firms particularly attractive investment conditions. 
6.2.2 Assessment of promotional measures and industrial policy management 
Promotional measures 
Our assessment of the linkage promotion programme (SMEELP and Mozlink I phases)58 
concludes that measures for upgrading the technological and business skills of the participat-
ing Mozambican SMEs and in establishing business relations between them and MOZAL 
have been successful, but that these effects have been quite limited in number and scope, as 
well as in structure. The results are limited to the creation of a small market niche for local 
firms that depend almost completely on MOZAL and have not contributed to the develop-
ment of an industrial cluster of innovative SMEs.59 This argument is developed in more de-
tail below. 
                                                 
58   To date, only assessments of the first two programme phases are available. 
59   Cf. also Castel-Branco (2004); Castel-Branco / Goldin (2003); APRM (2009, 163–65); Warren-
Rodriguez (2008, 20–21); Robbins / Lebani / Rogan (2008); IFC (2006, 4). 
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Under SMEELP, 16 SMEs were trained and awarded 28 contracts worth a total of over 
USD 5 million (USAID 2009, 4). Mozlink I built up the capacities of 45 SMEs, all of 
which were awarded contracts, and contributed to increasing MOZAL’s contracts with 
local firms: “Annual local purchasing from MozLink-affiliated companies increased from 
US$ 5 million in 2001 to US $13 million in 2005” (Jaspers / Mehta 2007, 11; it must be 
noted that MOZAL’s total annual purchasing from Mozambican firms including non-
Mozlink-affiliated and big companies is far greater, amounting to some USD 180 million, 
of which alone USD 96 million correspond to electricity and water; Macamo 2009). The 
SME’s that were trained have improved their skills in important areas such as quality, 
management, maintenance and safety, and a small network of 15 SMEs has been built to 
foster the exchange of information and mutual learning (Robbins / Lebani / Rogan 2008, 
25). 
Given the challenges to contracting with local SMEs described above, the results are 
noteworthy, but still limited. This assessment is corroborated by an evaluation of the 
SMEELP and Mozlink I phases summarised in IFC (2006, 4): “The small number of par-
ticipants and the fact that in some cases the same firm provided an increasing variety of 
goods and services suggests that the program focused on helping a small number of fa-
voured suppliers rather than developing the capacity of more local SMEs to supply large 
firms”. Furthermore, as reported in Section 5.4, the impact of Beluluane Industrial Park 
also appears to have been limited since no industrial cluster has developed and only a 
modest number of firms have been attracted. 
Another limitation of the programme is that basically only backward linkages were estab-
lished – and no significant forward linkages. This has to do with the fact that Mozambican 
firms have not yet acquired the technical capacity to manufacture goods from aluminium 
ingots (Robbins / Lebani / Rogan 2008, 28). The SMEs with supply opportunities that are 
participating in the programme mainly belong to the following sectors: metallurgical ser-
vices and products, transportation and auto mechanical services, construction, electrical 
products and services, and laundry (Jaspers / Mehta 2007, 63) – as well as catering, secu-
rity, and other services. 
Warren-Rodriguez (2008, 11–19) takes a closer look at the linkages built between local 
firms from the metalworking (metallurgical) sector and MOZAL. The author confirms the 
improvement of the skill and technological base of the SMEs subcontracting with MO-
ZAL, thanks to the quite intense training courses, which included a quality-assurance 
module based on a simplified, adapted version of ISO-9000 that was developed in partner-
ship between MOZAL and the Mozambican Institute for Quality and Standards. More-
over, the close interaction between the suppliers and MOZAL’s engineers to ensure the 
required standards of products and services contributed to technological learning. In addi-
tion, several Mozambican firms established joint ventures with foreign specialised suppli-
ers in order to qualify to do business with MOZAL, a factor that in some cases further 
contributed to technological learning and even opened access to new markets, such as the 
cases of COMETAL, Agro-Alfa and METECH described by Warren-Rodriguez (2008, 
16–18). Nevertheless, the author emphasises that these results cannot be attributed to the 
promotional measures of the linkage programme alone. Since the screening process held 
prior to the promotional activities ensured that only firms with high businessdevelopment 
potential participated in the training and further measures, arguably a good portion of the 
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results is attributable to the skill and development level already acquired by the firms 
before the programme began. Overall, Warren-Rodriguez (2008, 21) concludes that the 
effects of the linkages between MOZAL and SMEs on the technological development of 
local firms in the metalworking sector have been positive but limited and that “beyond 
this very specific experience, the general institutional setting for industrial (technology) 
development in place in Mozambique remains weak, with poor coordination mechanisms 
between the different institutions working in this area, as well as between these and other 
relevant government agencies”. 
Beyond the specific promotional programme, the overall local development effects 
through linkages of the MOZAL mega project must be assessed as modest, particularly 
when judged in relation to the huge investment of USD 2.4 billion. According to Robbins / 
Lebani / Rogan (2008, 27) MOZAL directly created only slightly more than 1,100 full-
time jobs (the capital cost of a direct MOZAL job is 26 times higher than elsewhere in the 
manufacturing sector; Castel-Branco 2004, 27). An additional estimated 2,500 jobs were 
created through linkages. During the construction and expansion phases, 15,000 temporary 
jobs were created. These figures make very clear that it is not mega projects like MOZAL 
that will generate the much-needed jobs for the Mozambican economy. Indeed, MOZAL’s 
positive net contribution to Mozambique’s balance of payment amounts to USD 100 mil-
lion per year (Castel-Branco 2004, 28). Nevertheless, in its assessment, APRM (2009, 
164) underlines that only 10 percent of MOZAL’s revenues remain in the Mozambican 
economy, that tax revenues are minimal60 due to the extraordinary tax benefits granted by the 
GOM, and concludes that “while MOZAL’s contribution to Mozambique’s economy as a 
whole is important and it makes an important contribution to Mozambique’s GDP, its impact 
is limited. The result is an isolated economic enclave that uses large quantities of scarce re-
sources without returning revenue or jobs to the economy”.61 
Industrialpolicy management 
In the context of a mega-FDI investment like MOZAL, which has a powerful and re-
sourceful group of investors, it is most relevant to analyse the strategic capability of the 
GOM’s industrialpolicy management.62 To structure the analysis, it is useful to conceive 
of the relation between the group of investors and the GOM as a bilateral negotiation, 
where the materialisation of the project and thus of the expected gains for the country 
(jobs, linkages, balance-of-payments contribution, tax receipts, etc.) depend on the pack-
age of investment incentives and obligations offered by the GOM. 
At first glance, it seems that the GOM’s bargaining position was very weak: There had 
been no precedent to such a big investment since the end of the civil war and the GOM 
had little to offer besides generous tax exemptions.63 As far as the Government’s stra-
                                                 
60   According to Thomas (2005, 7), around the year 2004 MOZAL generated an estimated government 
 revenue of USD 4.1 million per annum in tax revenues and USD 5 million per annum in dividends. 
61   See also Section 3.2 and Castel-Branco (2004). 
62   See Chapter 2 for a definition. 
63   Not even cheap electricity – which is the most important production factor besides capital for alumu
 nium production. Although with the Cahora Bassa dam on the Zambezi River Mozambique possesses a 
 huge elecricity generation capacity from hydropower (around 2,000 MW), the dam is not intercom
 nected with Southern Mozambique and sells almost all of the electricity generated to South Africa. The 
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tegic competences are concerned, these must be judged particularly low in the mid-
1990s: at that time there were almost no industrialpolicy strategies in place that could 
have provided a conceptual framework for the Government to deal with the project (as 
discussed in Chapter 5, the relevant strategies are all quite recent and a linkage concept 
only began to be developed in 1997). Therefore it is plausible to explain the outcome 
by the fact that the GOM overstated the development effects due to a lack of analytical 
capability and judged the reputational effect of the project as very high (an increase in 
investor confidence, future FDI projects, etc.) which caused it to offer an extremely 
generous tax incentive package without any major obligations (such as localcontent 
clauses). 
Nevertheless Castel-Branco (2004, 26–35) shows that by offering fewer tax exemptions 
Mozambique probably could still have closed the deal. Apparently the investors had a 
high preference for building the aluminium smelter near Maputo – not because of any 
comparative advantages or tax incentives that Mozambique had to offer, but rather due to 
the South African mineral-energy-complex’s strategic interests: first, BHP-Billiton wanted 
to avoid having a competitor – Kaiser had first approached the GOM with plans to build 
an aluminium smelter – succeed in expanding its production, so BHP-Billiton pursued an 
aggressive investment strategy; second, the South African electricity utility, Eskom, was 
very keen to provide the energy for the smelter and, by interlinking its grid with the Mo-
zambican grid, to establish itself as a player in the Mozambican electricity market. The 
Government of South Africa supported this strategy by offering an attractive incentive 
package to MOZAL that included cheap electricity tariffs through Eskom, which is Gov-
ernment-owned. This analysis suggests that – given the project’s high priority for South 
African investors – the GOM could have made a better deal for the country by offering 
less generous incentives. 
This Case Study shows that the GOM lacked the vision and the negotiating capacity to 
take greater advantage of the FDI project so as to have a greater development impact on 
the local economy or to generate much-needed tax revenues. However, it also illustrates 
the enormous imbalance in capacity and bargaining power when an alliance of leading 
multinationals backed by the Government of South Africa negotiates with one of the poor-
est governments of the world. 
However, there appears to be another factor besides lack of capacity that explains the rela-
tively low profile of the Government’s linkage-promotion activities. According to  
Nuvunga (2009, 29) the political elite is not interested in an orderly and transparent ap-
proach that promotes business opportunities for local SMEs. Instead, according to a man-
ager interviewed by Nuvunga, several politicians prefer to keep discretion over upcoming 
business opportunities and to use them for their private profit (by channelling them to their 
own firms or by earning commissions, etc.). 
                                                                                                                                                   
 electricity for the smelters – which consume more electricity than the rest of the country combined – is 
 imported from South Africa (Castel-Branco 2004, 14). 
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7 Conclusions 
This study has analysed the quality of Mozambique’s industrial policy and industrial pol-
icy management capability as one case in the context of a larger research project that aims 
at building evidence on the actual state of selective industrial policy in low and lower-
middle-income countries and the conditions for its success.64 In what follows the main 
conclusions from the Mozambican case are presented. 
Mozambique needs policies that foster broad-based sustainable economic development 
and generate income and jobs for its population. Despite the stable and remarkable macro-
economic growth rates over the last 15 years – that are in great part explained by huge 
capital-intense FDI projects as well as ODA inflows and by the very low initial GDP level 
– the vast majority of Mozambicans are disconnected from the few profitable and high 
value-creating economic enclaves, and work in subsistence farming or in mostly informal 
or non-competitive SMEs. Therefore, well-designed and coordinated industrial policy 
along the terms outlined in Chapter 2 could serve as a crucial instrument to foster the 
much-needed, broad-based economic growth, in addition to policies in areas such as edu-
cation, training and health care. Nevertheless, in Mozambique’s case there is a huge gap 
between the need for welfare-enhancing industrial policies and the ability of the Govern-
ment and the private sector to design and implement them. The results of the two case stud-
ies on selective industrialpolicy approaches (the cashew industry in Section 6.1, and linkage 
promotion in Section 6.2) are mixed, and show that failures are partly due to weaknesses in 
industrialpolicy management. 
Regarding the programmatic orientation of industrial policy it must be noted that both on 
paper and in practice, non-selective approaches are more elaborated and more prominent – 
for instance trade liberalisation and privatisation reforms; general FDI promotion; reforms 
to make regulations more business-friendly and to improve the general business climate, 
including access to finance. Selective industrial approaches are less palpable, and in prac-
tice, the GOM does not yet follow a clear strategy that would outline and guide targeted 
selective policies in order to foster the competitiveness of local enterprises, for example, 
by supporting technological learning or the creation of agglomeration economies and other 
spillovers, so that local enterprises would be able to take advantage of the market en-
hancement achieved through the non-selective policies. The partial successes found in the 
two case studies – for instance, the establishment of the AIA export-service company and 
the successful penetration of overseas consumer markets in the case of cashews, as well as 
the establishment of a number of backward linkages between MOZAL and local SMEs 
and the associated learning and upgrading of these SMEs regarding linkage promotion – 
are fairly limited in scope, and are substantially due to the strategic advice and practical 
support of specific donors’ projects. 
We therefore conclude that the GOM’s strategic capability for industrialpolicy manage-
ment is characterized by a lack of means, vision and leadership regarding the definition of 
an appropriate mix between improvements in the investment climate to create the proper 
conditions for private investment and market competition, and targeted interventions to 
accelerate productivity growth and enhance the competitiveness of Mozambican firms. 
                                                 
64   See Altenburg (2011) for an overview of, and lessons learned from, this research project. 
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The donors cannot compensate for these weaknesses in the GOM’s strategic capability 
because they are not a homogeneous group that would advocate for one main strategic line 
of action. Moreover, many of them have followed an approach inspired by the ‘Washing-
ton Consensus’ that disregarded selective measures; for them, industrial policy is not a 
priority field of intervention. In most cases in which donors support selective measures in 
particular projects, these are limited in scale, scope and time, and often do not incorporate 
government planning and learning cycles. 
In 1999, Cramer described the GOM’s position on industrial policy as follows: “In Mozam-
bique, all the evidence suggests that the state is in disarray, confused by a half-hearted ideo-
logical transformation and by being pulled constantly in different directions by donor inter-
ests (…), and lacks the capacity or will to produce a coherent and emphatic analysis and 
policy package for industrial sectors …” (Cramer 1999, 1263). Although there has been 
some progress since then, we still assess the GOM’s overall attitude towards industrial pol-
icy as being reactive to the interests of big investors and donors, rather than proactive or 
strategic. We base this assessment on our observation that the policy measures and projects 
that are enacted and implemented are those backed by investors’ coherent and clearly articu-
lated interests (an investment-promotion law and mega projects in the energy and mining 
sector) or donors (liberalisation, privatisation, and Doing-Business-style reforms which were 
supported by a coalition of influential donor organisations).65 In contrast, more complex 
industrial policy approaches – such as in the field of SME promotion – that demand that the 
Government play an active role in providing strategic direction; building coalitions with 
enterprises, financial institutions, local governments and donors; and facilitating or building 
coordination platforms mainly exist on paper and lack the drive needed to get implemented 
on a relevant scale. This pattern can be explained in part by the low technical capacity and 
institutional development of the State administration, by the weak formal organisation of the 
local private sector – in particular in what refers to small enterprises – and by the high aid-
dependency. Moreover, high aid-dependency creates incentives for the Government to pri-
marily focus on keeping high levels of aid flows, to secure political legitimacy by high 
spending levels in social sectors (Castel-Branco 2008, 14) and, hence to neglect, in relative 
terms, engaging in an active industrial policy. 
Although some projects pursue monitoring and evaluation approaches (mostly donor-
driven), there is no consistent system of feedback cycles and checks and balances to im-
prove overall industrialpolicy learning. First of all, it would be difficult to create such a 
culture of learning through trial and error because there is not yet a coherent and coordi-
nated industrial policy that deserves the name (see Chapter 5). Secondly, the GOM avoids 
accountability and tries to escape from transparent public evaluations of its policies. One 
exception is the annual Joint Review with the Program Aid Partners (PAP). However this 
review does not include industrial policy, since this is a cross-cutting issue that is not a 
high priority for most donors (see Chapter 4.3). 
Other governance features also weaken the GOM’s capabilities in industrialpolicy man-
agement capability, for instance the capability to establish clear rules of the game for mar-
ket-based competition, the capability to deliver services effectively, and the capability to 
avoid political capture. Widespread corruption results in the poor enforcement of measures 
meant to foster local industry (like the tax on raw cashewnut exports), in the opaque 
                                                 
65   See Castel-Branco (2008) for similar argumentation. 
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awarding of contracts based on favours, and in the intentional distortion of the implemen-
tation of business regulations to the advantage of inspectors and at the expense of busi-
nesses. FRELIMOparty dominance and weak checks and balances allow for selective in-
terventions and service providers to be misused to transfer resources to constituencies be-
fore elections in order to secure votes (as was reported by some interviewees in the case of 
the INCAJU). Finally, the fact that prominent FRELIMO cadres (including President 
Guebuza) simultaneously hold public office and direct powerful business groups they ac-
quired during the privatisation process, creates considerable conflicts of interest.66 This 
situation renders industrial policy, and economic policy in general, vulnerable to misuse 
for the particularistic benefit of enterprises owned by FRELIMO or party cadres.67 
Despite this rather pessimistic assessment of Mozambique’s industrial policy management 
capability, it is important to acknowledge that some progress and learning have taken 
place during the last years. For instance capacities in the state administration (particularly 
at the central government level), in business associations and in think tanks are slowly 
improving and thus also the conditions for establishing coordination platforms for selec-
tive industrial policies. Moreover the government has corrected some deficiencies in the 
policy framework like e.g. the extremely generous tax exemptions for mega projects or the 
state-centred top-down approach to SME promotion. Finally, as highlighted above, the 
case studies have also gathered evidence for some positive experiences with selective ap-
proaches that could be replicated. Therefore prospects for a welfare-enhancing industrial 
policy in Mozambique that combines improvements to the investment climate and market-
enhancing measures with targeted interventions to stimulate competitiveness and produc-
tivity growth of enterprises seem to improve. Nevertheless, for such an approach to be put 
in practice effectively the government and donors would have to radically revise their 
strategies and priorities and the governance would have to improve in terms of control of 
corruption and checks and balances. 
  
                                                 
66   See, e.g., the case of the concession for non-intrusive inspection services at the port of Maptuo  
 (Mosse / Munguambe 2007). 
67   Hanlon / Mosse (2009) even see a certain opportunity in this situation. They argue that the more  
development-oriented FRELIMO factions could use their combined political and economic power to en-
gage in an industrialpolicy approach that would build on their own business empires (see Section 4.3). 
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Table A1: Distribution of SMEs by activity 
Sector Number of businesses  Business sales (Mt 10^6) 
Small 
(a) 
Medium 
(b) 
Total SME 
(c)=(a)+(b) 
business units 
Small 
(d) 
Medium 
(e) 
Total SME 
(f)=(d)+(e) 
Agriculture, animal 
husbandry, hunting 
and forestry 
485 
(1.7%) 
132 
(0.5%) 
617 
(2.2%) 
118.661 
(0.4%) 
224.395 
(0.8%) 
343.056 
(1.2%) 
Fishery 
75 
(0.3%) 
57 
(0.2%) 
132 
(0.5%) 
55.162 
(0.1%) 
95.223 
(0.3%) 
150.385 
(0.5%) 
Extractive industries  
12 
(0.0%) 
34 
(0.1%) 
46 
(0.2%) 
37.486 
(0.1%) 
150.883 
(0.5%) 
188.369 
(0.7%) 
Manufacturing  
2.310 
(8.1%) 
518 
(1.8%) 
2.828 
(9.9%) 
7.535.574 
(27.3%) 
3.278.481 
(11.9%) 
10.814.055 
(39.2%) 
Production and dis-
tribution of electrici-
ty, gas and water 
9 
(0.0%) 
17 
(0.1%) 
26 
(0.1%) 
974.099 
(3.5%) 
86.813 
(0.3%) 
1.060.912 
(3.8%) 
Construction 
82 
(0.3%) 
150 
(0.5%) 
232 
(0.8%) 
406.065 
(1.5%) 
1.805.468 
(6.5%) 
2.211.533 
(8.0%) 
Wholesale and retail 
commerce; automo-
bile and motorcycle 
repairs; other repairs  
15.446 
(54.2%) 
911 
(3.2%) 
16.357 
(57.4%) 
3.434.044 
(12.4%) 
2.889.470 
(10.5%) 
6.323.514 
(22.9%) 
Accommodation 
and restaurants 
5.398 
(19.0%) 
341 
(1.2%) 
5.739 
(20.2%) 
1.069.525 
(3.9%) 
616.379 
(2.2%) 
1.685.904 
(6.1%) 
Transport, ware-
housing and com-
munication 
196 
(0.7%) 
126 
(0.4%) 
322 
(1.1%) 
122.961 
(0.4%) 
1.050.661 
(3.8%) 
1.173.622 
(4.3%) 
Financial services 
48 
(0.2 %) 
24 
(0.1%) 
72 
(0.3%) 
68.917 
(0.2%) 
304.919 
(1.1%) 
373.836 
(1.4%) 
Real estate, renting 
and service providers 
440 
(1.5%) 
140 
(0.5%) 
580 
(2.0%) 
178.624 
(0.6%) 
663.434 
(2.4%) 
842.058 
(3.1%) 
Education 
135 
(0.5%) 
98 
(0.3%) 
233 
(0.8%) 
19.988 
(0.1%) 
311.491 
(1.1%) 
331.479 
(1.2%) 
Health and social 
services 
60 
(0.2%) 
26 
(0.1%) 
86 
(0.3%) 
74.192 
(0.3%) 
29.922 
(0.1%) 
104.114 
(0.4%) 
Other activities 
1.157 
(4.1%) 
48 
(0.2%) 
1.205 
(4.2%) 
1.857.082 
(6.7%) 
141.882 
(0.5%) 
1.998.964 
(7.2%) 
Total 
25.853 
(90.8%) 
2.622 
(9.2%) 
28.475 
(100%) 
15.952.381 
(57.8%) 
11.649.421 
(42.2%) 
27.601.801 
(100%) 
Source: MIC (2008) 
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Table A2: Fiscal Benefits according to Law 4/2009 
 Import of 
goods, VAT 
Investment 
tax credit 
Accelerated 
depreciation
Moderni-
zation and 
new  
technologies 
Investment 
in  
professional 
training 
Expenditure 
considered 
as fiscal 
costs 
Tax  
Reductions 
General Exemption 
from import 
duty in VAT 
Class ‘K’ 
5% 
Maputo, 
10 % other 
provinces 
Up to 50 % Deduction 
equal up to  
10 % of tax-
able income 
Deduction 
up to 10 % 
of taxable 
income 
Maputo  
110 %, 
Provinces 
120 % 
 
Creation of 
basic infra-
structure 
Exemption 
from import 
duty in VAT 
Class ‘K’ 
     80 % reduction 
on income tax 
 
Rural com-
merce and 
rural industry 
Exemption 
from import 
duty in VAT 
Class ‘K’ plus 
specific items 
      
Manufacturing 
and assembly 
industries 
Exemption on 
duties on raw 
materials and 
other imports 
      
Agriculture 
and fishery 
Exemption 
from import 
duty in VAT 
Class ‘K’ 
     80 % reduction 
on income tax 
till 2015; 
50 % till 2025 
Hostelry and 
tourism 
Exemption 
from Import 
Duty in VAT 
Class ‘K’ plus 
specific items 
Special 
conditions 
Special 
conditions 
    
Science and 
technology 
parks 
      First 5 Years 
100 % reduc-
tion on income 
tax, next 5 
years 50 %, 
following  
5 years 25 %. 
Large projects 
(ca. 500 Mio 
USD) 
Exemption from 
import duties 
and VAT 
      
Rapid devel-
opment zones 
(areas + activi-
ties specified) 
Exemption  
from  
import duties 
and VAT 
20 %      
Free industrial 
zones 
Exemption 
from  
import duties 
and VAT 
     10 Years 100 % 
reduction on 
income tax, next 
5 years 50 %, 
following  
5 years 25 %. 
Special eco-
nomic zones 
Exemption 
from  
import duties 
and VAT 
     5 Years 100 % 
reduction on 
income tax, next 
5 years 50 %, 
following  
5 years 25 %. 
Source: Law 4/2009, elaboration by the authors 
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Table A3: Raw cashewnut uses (volume in metric tonnes) 
Harvest Vol. Traded 
Uses 
Vol.  
Exported % 
V.  
Processed % Other use % 
2000/2001 52.608 27.845,96 53 % 6.275,00 12 % 17.967,44 34 % 
2001/2002 52.088 25.592,20 49 % - 0 % 24.584,50 47 % 
2002/2003 50.177 36.288,54 72 % 3.000,00 6 % 24.529,46 49 % 
2003/2004 63.818 20.216,82 32 % 3.200,00 5 % 18.867,68 30 % 
2004/2005 104.335 63.346,31 61 % 13.870,00 13 % 27.120,69 26 % 
2005/2006 62.821 26.343,82 42 % 21.943,00 35 % 14.529,18 23 % 
2006/2007 74.397 24.335,48 33 % 20.280,00 27 % 29.781,52 40 % 
2007/2008 96.540 31.606,67 33 % 24.000,00 25 % 21.549,1 22 % 
Source: INCAJU (2008b, 12) 
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Table A4: Interviews 
Name Instituiton Interview date 
Thomas Eberherr Consultant to the Provincial Director of Tourism, Inhambane, CIM Nov 08 
Jan Tillmans MPD; CIM, Consultant for Local Development 28.04.09 
Nikolas Männling National Directorate of Industry, Ministry of Industry and Trade; Overseas Development Institute Consultant for Industrial Policy 28.04.09 
Manfred Schug Consultant to MPD 28.04.09 
Gert Juntermanns KfW, Sector Coordinator for Sustainable Economic Development 29.04.09 
Ute Hainbuch German Embassy Maputo, BMZ Head of Cooperation 29.04.09 
Mario Sauder German Embassy Maputo, Deputy Head of Delegation 29.04.09 
Jim LaFleur CTA Economic Advisor 29.04.09 
Lutero Simango Parliament, Co-Chair, Economic Committee 29.04.09 
John Barnes Consultant to MPD, UNDP 30.04.09 
Dieter Orlowski Consultant, Ximungo 30.04.09 
Felix Cossa InWent Local Representative 30.04.09 
Peter Luhmann  Country Director, GTZ (German Technical Cooperation), Mozambique 02.05.09 
Willy Parlmeyer GFA, GTZ 02.05.09 
Svenja Paulino GTZ Project Coordinator for Sustainable Economic Development, Mozambique 02.05.09 
Nuno Maposse CPI Director Project Management 02.05.09 
Odete Tsamba MIC, Director Institute for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (IPEME) 04.05.09 
Eckehard Fricke Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (DED) Country Director 04.05.09 
Dario Milano 
Rossario Marpusse Italian Cooperation Head of Private-Sector Working Group 05.05.09 
Sidomio MIC National Director of Industry 06.05.09 
Sergio Macamo National Director Project Implementation UNIT World Bank Project  06.05.09 
Adrian Frey Director Solutions 06.05.09 
Felix Fischer IMF Director, Mozambique 06.05.09 
Manfred Öhm Friedrich-Ebert Foundation Resident Representative 08.05.09 
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Svenja Paulino  GTZ Project Coordinator for Sustainable Economic Development, Mozambique 05.08.09 
Álvaro Martins  Cashew Processor, Madecaju 05.08.09 
Jake Walter Technoserve, Inc. 06.08.09 
Raimundo Matule  INCAJU 06.08.09 
Carlos Costa  AGRIFUTURO/African Cashew Alliance 06.08.09 
Antonio Souto  GAPI 07.08.09 
Dipac Jaiantilal Cruzeiro do Sul 07.08.09 
Marcos Vaena IFC 07.08.09 
Mauricio dos Santos Former cashew processor, Angoche 07.08.09 
Rafik Ibrahim  Cashew processor, IPCCN 09.08.09 
Martin Mason  CLUSA 09.08.09 
Yunuss A. Gafar  Gani Comercial, Cashew processor, Cajú Ilha, AICAJU 10.08.09 
Angelo de Souza Cashew processor and trader, Ozivacaju 10.08.09 
Sr. Jorge  Director Cashew Nursery, INCAJU 11.08.09 
Various Forum of Farmers’ Associations, Naihava 11.08.09 
Various Condornuts processing factory, Nametil 11.08.09 
Sr. Cardoso  Former cashew processor, Moma 12.08.09 
Silvino Martins Cashew processor, Condornuts Ltda 12.08.09 
Moisés Raposo Ikuru Ltda 12.08.09 
Felipe Miranda  Cashew processor, Miranda Industrial Ltda 13.08.09 
Martin Mason  CLUSA 13.08.09 
Kathrin Seelige  GTZ 14.08.09 
Ute Hainbuch  German Embassy, Head of Cooperation 14.08.09 
Ilse Fuernkranz GAPI Oct 09  
